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Whistling in Silence:  
The Implications of Arbitration on 
Qui Tam Claims  
Under the False Claims Act 
Mathew Andrews* 
ABSTRACT 
For nearly twenty years, corporate defendants have sought 
unsuccessfully to use arbitration to roll back protections for whistleblowers 
suing under federal law.  The state and federal judiciaries have long stymied 
these efforts, on the grounds that defendants cannot force the Government’s 
claims into the secretive forum of arbitration.  In January 2013, this 
protection came to an end.  A federal court ruled for the first time that a 
whistleblower suing on behalf of the United States must pursue its action in 
arbitration.  Five months later, this trend continued as federal courts 
have compelled arbitration of state law qui tam actions.   This article 
argues that while the courts foundered in their reasoning, their holdings 
were legally correct based on Supreme Court case law and a legislative 
loophole in the Dodd-Frank Amendments of 2010.  As a result, 
arbitration could fundamentally alter the way that whistleblower actions 
are investigated and prosecuted, and may blunt what has been described 
as the “government’s primary litigation tool for recovering losses 
sustained as the result of fraud.” 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Nearly two years ago, Justice Kagan dissented that “arbitration threatens 
to become . . . a mechanism easily made to block the vindication of 
meritorious federal claims and insulate wrongdoers from liability.”1  The 
Justice’s words are concerning because it is the Supreme Court that has 
pushed the boundaries of arbitrable disputes.  Over the past two decades, the 
Court has stretched the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to allow companies to 
condition employment on workers signing arbitration clauses.2  As a result, 
employees increasingly face a dilemma: either forfeit their right to a judicial 
forum or lose their chance at employment. 
Congress responded to this threat in 2010.3  As part of its landmark 
legislation following the 2008 financial crisis, Congress overhauled the use 
of pre-dispute arbitration by employers.4  The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 
amended nearly all of the federal government’s whistleblower statutes to 
prohibit companies from forcing whistleblowers into arbitration.5  Its anti-
arbitration provisions are meant to ensure that those who seek to uncover 
 
* Associate, Morvillo Abramowitz, Grand, Iason, & Anello LLP; J.D., Yale Law School, 2014; 
B.A., Yale University, 2011.  I am particularly grateful to my friends and family for their feedback 
and support.  You have my greatest thanks.  To the Dispute Resolution Law Journal staff—my 
gratitude for your excellent edits and suggestions.  All errors are my own. 
 1. Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2320 (2013). 
 2. Judith Resnik, Renting Judges for Secret Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/01/opinion/renting-judges-for-secret-rulings.html?_r=0.  
 3. 7 U.S.C. § 26(n)(2) (2012) (prohibiting arbitration of whistleblower suits brought under 
the Commodity Exchange Act); 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (granting the Consumer Protection Financial 
Bureau authority to prohibit arbitration); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e) (prohibiting arbitration of 
whistleblower suits brought under the Securities and Exchange Act); id. § 1514A(e)(2) (prohibiting 
whistleblower suits brought under Sarbanes-Oxley from being arbitrated). 
 4. See supra note 3. 
 5. Id. 
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wrongdoing do not “los[e] the court system as a means of publicizing their 
claim[s],” and serve to protect both “investors” and the public.6 
The legal literature has failed to notice that Congress left a debilitating 
loophole in the nation’s whistleblower laws when it passed the Dodd-Frank 
Act.7  In particular, Congress failed to add anti-arbitration provisions to the 
Government’s “primary litigation tool for recovering losses sustained as the 
result of fraud”: the False Claims Act (FCA).8 
Through a unique legal mechanism called qui tam litigation, the FCA 
authorizes individuals to bring civil suits on behalf of the federal 
government.9  In return, these “relators” receive a share of the recovery.10  
Since the FCA was amended in 1986, whistleblowers have brought nearly 
ten thousand complaints under the act,11 recovering nearly $26 billion in 
settlements and judgments.12  In 2012, a whistleblower helped the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) obtain the largest health care fraud settlement 
in U.S. history.13 
 
 6. Bradley Mark Nerderman, Should Courts Apply Dodd-Frank’s Prohibition on the 
Enforcement of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements Retroactively?, 98 IOWA L. REV. 2141, 2169 
(2013). 
 7. To the extent that the legal literature acknowledges this situation, it merely comments that 
Congress did not amend the False Claims Act.  See Mark J. Oberti, New Wave of Employment 
Retaliation and Whistleblowing, 38 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 43, 99 (2012).  The literature has not 
considered whether qui tam claims are arbitrable as a result of this omission, how defendants would 
go about compelling arbitration of such claims, and what the policy consequences of such arbitration 
would be.  
 8. U.S. ex rel. Marcy v. Rowan Cos., 520 F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 9. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b). 
 10. Id. § 3730(d). 
 11. Civil Div., Fraud Statistics, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 2 (Dec. 23, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf (using 2013 data). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Office of Pub. Affairs, GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3 Billion to Resolve 
Fraud Allegations and Failure to Report Safety Data, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (July 2, 2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/July/12-civ-842.html. 
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Congress’s failure to amend the FCA is understandable.  For nearly 
twenty years, defendants have sought to use arbitration to limit the 
effectiveness of the statute.14  Nonetheless, the state and federal judiciaries 
have long blocked their efforts.  As the courts have reasoned, the 
Government, not relators, owns the qui tam claims.15  Defendants, therefore, 
could not compel the Government’s claim into arbitration because the 
Government is not a signatory to relators’ arbitration contracts.16  Against 
this background of judicial protection, it may have been unnecessary for 
Congress to amend the FCA in 2010 to bar arbitration. 
In January 2013, this protection came to an end.17  A federal court ruled 
for the first time that a whistleblower suing on behalf of the United States 
must pursue the action in arbitration.18  Five months later, another federal 
court held similarly and compelled arbitration of a California state law qui 
tam action.19  The district courts’ rationales were identical.  Although a qui 
tam action is necessarily “brought in the name of the Government,” the 
action “still represents a claim belonging to the [p]laintiffs themselves.”20  
Defendants can therefore force relators into arbitration on their qui tam 
claims.  These district courts are not alone in their reasoning.  In July 2014, 
 
 14. See, e.g., Morgan v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 612 F. Supp. 2d 81, 84 (D.D.C. 2009); 
United States v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., No. 99 C 8287, 2002 WL 31497338, at *1-3 (N.D. 
Ill. Nov. 7, 2002); Mikes v. Strauss, 889 F. Supp. 746, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Iskanian v. CLS 
Transp. L.A., LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 361 (2014). 
 15. Morgan, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 84; Cancer Treatment Ctrs., 2002 WL 31497338, at *1-3; 
Mikes, 889 F. Supp. at 755; Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 361; Janet Cooper Alexander, To Skin a Cat: 
Qui Tam Actions as a State Legislative Response to Concepcion, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1203, 
1234 (2013). 
 16. See supra note 15. 
 17. Deck v. Miami Jacobs Bus. Coll. Co., 2013 WL 394875, at *6-7 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 
2013). 
 18. Deck, 2013 WL 394875, at *6-7. 
 19. Cunningham v. Leslie’s Poolmart, Inc., 2013 WL 3233211, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 
2013). 
 20. Deck, 2013 WL 394875, at *6-7; see Cunningham, 2013 WL 3233211, at *7-8. 
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the California Supreme Court acknowledged that plaintiffs may be 
contractually obligated to arbitrate state law qui tam actions,21 and several 
federal courts have required plaintiffs to do so.22 
This article is the first to address this shift toward qui tam arbitration.  It 
is also the first to demonstrate that qui tam claims are arbitrable under 
prevailing Supreme Court precedent.  By failing to include anti-arbitration 
provisions in the FCA, Congress set the groundwork for corporate 
defendants to oust whistleblower suits from court, and employers are 
obliging.  Corporations have begun to prevail in federal court and are 
creating precedent in favor of qui tam arbitration.  Employers are amending 
their boilerplate arbitration clauses to include language covering “private 
attorney general” actions23—another name for qui tam actions.24  As the 
number of qui tam suits in federal courts continues to grow, defendants will 
have every incentive to push for the cheaper, faster, and quieter avenue of 
arbitration.  As a result, corporate defendants in the coming years can blunt 
the Government’s primary weapon in the fight against fraud, and tip the 
scales in defendants’ favor. 
The rest of this piece shows how defendants might go about compelling 
qui tam claims into arbitration, and demonstrates the public policy 
consequences of their doing so.  The article proceeds in six parts.  Part II 
provides background on the False Claims Act and the Federal Arbitration 
Act, and describes how an individual dispute involving qui tam arbitration 
might arise. 
 
 21. See Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 391 (2014) (“The arbitration 
agreement gives us no basis to assume that the parties would prefer to resolve a [qui tam] claim 
through arbitration . . . . The parties have not addressed these questions and may do so on remand.”).  
 22. Zenelaj v. Handybook Inc., No. 14-CV-05449-TEH, 2015 WL 971320, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 3, 2015); Martinez v. Leslie’s Poolmart, Inc., No. 8:14-CV-01481-CAS, 2014 WL 5604974, at 
*5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2014). 
 23. Scott v. TitleMax of S.C. Inc., 2012 WL 393365 (D.S.C. Jan. 17, 2012); Magee v. 
Advance Am. Servicing of Arkansas, Inc., 2009 WL 890991 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 1, 2009).  
 24. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Branch Consultants v. Allstate Ins. Co., 560 F.3d 371, 376 (5th Cir. 
2009). 
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Part III analyzes why lower courts have split on whether qui tam claims 
are arbitrable, and demonstrates that courts have disagreed on whether 
relators “own” the qui tam claims.  As the argument goes, if the Government 
(and not the relator) owns the claim, then a relator cannot sign a contract 
binding the Government’s claim into arbitration.  As a result, qui tam claims 
would not be arbitrable. 
Part IV argues that lower courts on both sides of the debate have erred 
in reasoning about whether relators “own” the claims.  Lower courts have 
failed to reach a principled answer because they have ignored the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence on how relators bring their claims.  By utilizing the 
Court’s standing jurisprudence, Part IV makes a unique argument for why 
qui tam claims are arbitrable based on relators’ status as “partial assignees” 
under the FCA. 
Part V then shows that if relators “own” the qui tam claims, principles 
of contractual interpretation would mandate arbitration.  Because arbitration 
is a matter of contract, a court cannot compel arbitration of a dispute that the 
parties have not agreed to arbitrate.  While the circuits use three different 
standards to determine whether parties have agreed to arbitrate a particular 
type of claim, Part V shows that with a bit of clever defense lawyering, qui 
tam suits would be arbitrable under each standard. 
Part VI demonstrates the significant and detrimental policy implications 
of qui tam arbitration.  Given the complexity of qui tam claims,25 relators 
must cooperate extensively with the Government26 and have full access to 
discovery in order to prosecute their qui tam actions.27  Arbitration conflicts 
 
 25. Donald H. Caldwell, Jr., Qui Tam Actions: Best Practices for Relator’s Counsel, 38 J. 
HEALTH L. 367, 374 (2005). 
 26. U.S. ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 
1149, 1154 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting S. REP. NO. 345, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S. 
Code Cong. & Admin. News 5271).  
 27. See Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1416 (9th Cir. 1992); Michael Loucks, Impacts 
of the Affordable Care Act and Anti-Kickback Legislation on Health Care Industry Clients, 
ASPATORE, June 2013, at 1, 10, available at 2013 WL 3772666.  
6
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with both of these endeavors.  Because this conflict is likely not “inherent” 
under Supreme Court case law, corporate defendants can blunt the 
effectiveness of the FCA without losing their ability to arbitrate.  Congress, 
therefore, left a significant loophole in the nation’s whistleblower laws by 
failing to amend the FCA to include anti-arbitration provisions. 
Part VII concludes by examining the broader policy consequences of qui 
tam arbitration.  Qui tam arbitration could tip the balance in defendants’ 
favors by doing more than limiting relators’ rights.  Qui tam arbitration 
could also limit the Government’s right to a judicial forum.  Should the DOJ 
intervene into a relator’s action, defendants might be able to compel the 
agency into arbitration as well.  Likewise, if the DOJ intervenes after an 
adverse judgment in arbitration, the agency could be barred from relitigating 
the claims or issues.  In short, qui tam arbitration could do what no arbitrable 
claim has done before—limit the Government’s right to prosecute actions 
based on an arbitration clause signed only by private individuals.28 
 
 28. See E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 297 (2002) (declining to decide whether 
an adverse judgment against an individual bringing a claim under the ADEA would bar an executive 
agency from bringing a claim for the same conduct under the act). 
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II. BACKGROUND ON THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND THE FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION ACT 
The FCA was originally enacted during the Civil War to deter fraud by 
defense contractors.29  Nonetheless, the statute was relatively toothless until 
Congress amended it in 1986.30  Pursuant to the amendments, the FCA 
imposes civil liability upon “[a]ny person” who “knowingly presents, or 
causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or 
approval.”31  Further, the FCA mandates treble damages and a civil penalty 
of up to ten thousand dollars per claim.32 
The FCA’s qui tam procedure begins when a private person, the relator, 
brings a civil action “for the person and for the United States Government” 
against the alleged false claimant.33  To initiate the action, the relator 
delivers a copy of the complaint and any supporting evidence to the 
Government,34 which then has sixty days to intervene35 and assume primary 
responsibility for prosecution.36  If the Government declines to intervene 
within that sixty-day period, the relator has the exclusive right to conduct the 
action,37 and the Government may subsequently intervene only on a showing 
 
 29. Michael J. Davidson, Applying the False Claims Act to Commercial IT Procurements, 34 
PUB. CONT. L.J. 25, 26 (2004). 
 30. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Holder, 673 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 2011) (“The 1986 
Amendments expanded the FCA’s scope, increased the penalties, lowered the requisite standard of 
knowledge and intent, revised the process for a qui tam relator to file suit, and expanded the number 
of qui tam relators permitted to sue.”).  
 31. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2012). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. § 3730(b)(1). 
 34. Id. § 3730(b)(2). 
 35. Id. § 3730(b)(2), (4). 
 36. Id. § 3730(c)(1). 
 37. Id. § 3730(b)(4). 
8
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of “good cause.”38  Regardless of the DOJ’s intervention decision, the relator 
is entitled to a court hearing should the DOJ attempt to dismiss the suit,39 
and to a court determination of reasonableness prior to the DOJ’s settlement 
of the claim.40 
The relator will receive a share of any proceeds from the action.  By 
statute, this share ranges from fifteen to twenty-five percent if the 
Government intervenes, and from twenty-five to thirty percent if the 
government does not—plus attorney’s fees and costs.41  It is ultimately the 
court’s responsibility to determine what is reasonable.42 
Like the False Claims Act, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) has a long 
history.  The FAA was originally enacted in 1925 and then reenacted and 
codified in 1947 as Title 9 of the United States Code.43  Its purpose was to 
oppose longstanding judicial hostility towards arbitration agreements and to 
give such agreements the same legal footing as other contracts.44  The FAA 
provides for stays of proceedings in federal district courts when an issue in 
the proceeding is referable to arbitration.45  The statute further allows for 
orders compelling arbitration when one party has failed, neglected, or 
refused to comply with an arbitration agreement.46  As the Supreme Court 
has held, these provisions to manifest a “liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements.”47 
 
 38. Id. § 3730(c)(3). 
 39. Dismissal prevents a relator from carrying out the action on his or her own and is distinct 
from declining to intervene.  While there is judicial review of the former decision, there is none for 
the latter.  Id. § 3730(c)(2)(A)-(B), (c)(3).  
 40. Id. § 3730(c)(2). 
 41. Id. § 3730(d)(1)-(2). 
 42. See U.S. ex rel. Shea v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 2d 78, 84 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 43. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991). 
 44. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-220 (1985). 
 45. 9 U.S.C. § 3. 
 46. Id. § 4.   
 47. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
9
Andrews: Whistling in Silence: The Implications of Arbitration on Qui Tam
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2015
  
[Vol. 15: 203, 2015] Whistling in Silence 
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
212 
Based on these statutes, a typical dispute raising qui tam arbitration 
could proceed as follows.  Prior to hiring an individual, a company would 
require that the person sign an employment agreement with a boilerplate 
arbitration clause.  Ordinarily, such clauses state that the employee and the 
company agree to arbitrate “[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or 
relating to this [employment] Agreement or the breach thereof.”48  These 
clauses are typically non-negotiable.49 
Sometime later, the company would enter into a separate contract with 
the Government for the provision of some type of good or service.  In the 
course of that contract, the company would fraudulently bill the 
Government.  The frauds could include any range of activities, from 
charging the Government for meals not actually served to troops in Iraq50 to 
requesting Medicare compensation for non-existent medical procedures.51  
After an employee witnesses the alleged fraudulent activity, she would file a 
claim under seal with the DOJ.  The DOJ would then decide whether to 
intervene.  Should the DOJ decline, the relator would bring the action on her 
own in court.  Should the DOJ intervene, the agency and the relator would 
bring the claims jointly in a judicial forum.  In either case, the defendant 
would receive judicial notice of the allegations following the Government’s 
intervention decision.  The defendant would then seek to compel the relator 
into arbitration based on the clause in whistleblower’s employment 
agreement—and spark the litigation that is the subject of the rest of this 
article. 
 
 48. See, e.g., Orcutt v. Kettering Radiologists, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 746, 753 (S.D. Ohio 
2002).   
 49. Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 121 F. Supp. 2d 643, 647 (N.D. Ohio 2000). 
 50. U.S. ex rel. McBride v. Halliburton Co., Civ. Action No. 05-00828 (HHK), 2007 WL 
1954441 (D.D.C. July 5, 2007). 
 51. Orcutt, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 747. 
10
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III. THE LOWER COURTS ARE SPLIT ON WHETHER QUI TAM SUITS ARE 
ARBITRABLE BASED ON WHETHER RELATORS “OWN” THEIR CLAIMS 
The solidly entrenched, though little discussed, judicial principle that 
qui tam actions cannot be arbitrated is now in doubt.  The principle 
originated nearly twenty years ago in Mikes v. Strauss, where a federal 
district court for the first time rejected qui tam arbitration.52  As the court 
held, a relator “stands as a private representative of the [G]overnment” in her 
qui tam actions.53  Thus, the Government, and not the relator, owns the 
claim, because the whistleblower participates only in the “recovery to which 
the [G]overnment may be entitled.”54  The court therefore was “not 
convinced that [the] plaintiff, suing on the government’s behalf, [was] 
necessarily bound by [the arbitration clause’s] terms,” given that the 
“[G]overnment was not a party” to the relator’s employment agreement.55 
During the next two decades, federal courts adopted the Mikes 
“ownership” rationale in both holdings56 and dicta.57  As the courts have 
held, qui tam disputes cannot be arbitrated because the dispute is not 
 
 52. Mikes v. Strauss, 889 F. Supp. 746, 755 (1995); 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. 
 56. See Morgan v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 612 F. Supp. 2d 81, 84 (D.D.C. 2009) (a 
relator’s qui tam action cannot “be subject to arbitration inasmuch as an FCA relator stands in the 
shoes of the United States and the United States has not agreed to arbitrate FCA claims”); United 
States v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., 2002 WL 31497338, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 2002) 
(holding that qui tam suit could not be arbitrated because it was not a dispute “between the parties” 
to the arbitration contract, because the relator brings suit “on behalf of the United States”).   
 57. U.S. ex rel. McBride v. Halliburton Co., 2007 WL 1954441, at *5 (D.D.C. July 5, 2007) 
(citing Mikes, 899 F. Supp. at 756-57); Orcutt v. Kettering Radiologists, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 746, 
756 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (citing same); see U.S. ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 
F.3d 370, 381 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing McBride, 2007 WL 1954441, at *4–5; Orcutt, 199 F. Supp. 2d 
at 754-56; Mikes, 889 F. Supp. at 755-57); U.S. ex rel. Cassaday v. KBR, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 2d 850, 
858 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (citing same); U.S. ex rel. Godfrey, No. 1:05cv1418, at 17-18 (E.D. Va. Nov. 
13, 2007) (citing same). 
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between relators and corporate defendants, but between the Government and 
those that have allegedly defrauded it.58  Thus, a relator cannot waive the 
Government’s right to proceed in court. 
The secondary literature has joined the courts in arguing that qui tam 
claims are not arbitrable.59  As Professor Janet Alexander has recently 
argued, qui tam actions cannot be compelled to arbitration because such 
suits “do not involve claims belonging to private individuals at all.”60  
Instead, the claims belong to the Government.61  Because the FCA provides 
the relator only a “financial stake in the recovery” and a “right of action,” a 
relator cannot be forced to bring the state’s claim in arbitration.62  As a 
result, Professor Alexander proposes that states cabin employers’ use of 
arbitration clauses by passing qui tam statutes like the California Private 
Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”).63 
Despite the recent scholarly attention and nearly two decades of judicial 
precedent, the legal literature has overlooked a significant development.  In 
2013, federal courts began to curtail their protection of qui tam suits.  The 
case, Deck v. Miami Jacobs Bus. Coll. Co., was not much different than any 
other qui tam suit.64  Several relators brought a qui tam action against a 
private college for making allegedly false certifications to the federal 
 
 58. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
 59. E.g., Sean Estes, Can You Be Forced to Arbitrate Your FCA Claims?, JAMES HOYER (June 
13, 2014), http://www.jameshoyer.com/can-you-be-forced-to-arbitrate-your-fca-claims/ (“[Y]our 
underlying FCA fraud case will certainly go to court because that claim belongs to the government 
and is therefore beyond the scope of any employment agreement you might sign.”).  
 60. See Alexander, supra note 15, at 1228; id. at 1224-25 (“The relator does not sue to recover 
group members’ individual claims for compensatory damages. Rather, a qui tam suit seeks to 
recover on the state’s own claim, measured by the number of violations, and payable to the state.”).  
 61. Id. at 1228. 
 62. Id. at 1234. 
 63. Id. at 1234-35.  
 64. Deck v. Miami Jacobs Bus. Coll. Co., 2013 WL 394875, at *6-7 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 
2013). 
12
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government.65  The defendant subsequently sought to compel arbitration 
based on the relators’ contracts with the college.66  The Southern District of 
Ohio nonetheless became the first court to compel arbitration of a qui tam 
claim.67  The court cited no precedent for its holding.  Instead, it relied solely 
on the FCA’s text.  As the court found, the statute states that qui tam actions 
are “for the person and for the United States Government” (emphasis 
added).68  The court, therefore, interpreted this to mean that even though a 
qui tam suit is “‘brought in the name of the Government,’ it still represents a 
claim belonging to the [p]laintiffs themselves.”69  As a result, the relator was 
bound to arbitrate. 
The reasoning in Deck was incomplete.  The court pointed to no case 
law for the holding that relators own their claims.  Likewise, the court 
neither indicated whether arbitration would be binding on the relator,70 nor 
whether the Government would be barred by precluded from relitigating 
claims or issues.  In short, the Deck opinion raised more questions than it 
answered. 
Five months later, the federal district court for the Central District of 
California similarly compelled arbitration of a qui tam action in 
Cunningham v. Leslie’s Poolmart, Inc.71  The decision did not cite Deck.  In 
this case, the plaintiff brought its claim under Professor Alexander’s 
 
 65. Id 
 66. Id 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012)). 
 69. Id. 
 70. The court stated that “[a]fter arbitration on all claims, the parties shall either request that 
the Attorney General consent to the resolution of the FCA claims . . . or resume litigation on the 
FCA claims in this Court.”  Id. at *8.  This holding does not clarify whether the court would review 
the FCA claims de novo or under the FAA’s “extremely deferential standard.”  Dluhos v. Strasberg, 
321 F.3d 365, 370 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 71. Cunningham v. Leslie’s Poolmart, Inc., No. CV 13-2122 CAS (CWx), 2013 WL 3233211, 
at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2013). 
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aforementioned, “unarbitrable” California PAGA.72  In compelling the 
PAGA claim into arbitration, the district court noted that PAGA suits “are, 
in essence, a form of qui tam action.”73  As with qui tam suits, a PAGA 
plaintiff pursues civil penalties “on behalf of the government” and receives a 
twenty-five percent portion of any settlement or judgment.74  As a result, a 
PAGA plaintiff “seeks to vindicate her own right to a substantial portion of 
an award of civil penalties, not the rights of other[s].”75  Accordingly, the 
court concluded that this “individual” claim “against the Company” was 
subject to the arbitration clause.76 
The federal judiciary has not been alone in its holdings.  Most recently, 
the California Supreme Court in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los 
Angeles acknowledged that qui tam claims brought under PAGA could be 
subject to arbitration.77  The acknowledgment arose in the context of another 
issue: whether California can ban arbitration clauses requiring employees to 
waive their right to bring PAGA claims in any forum, including arbitration.78  
In upholding the California statute, the Court ruled that PAGA “lies outside 
the FAA’s coverage” and is therefore not preempted.79  As the Court 
reasoned, a qui tam claim is “not a dispute between an employer and an 
employee.”80  Instead, it “is a dispute between an employer and the state.”81  
As such, “qui tam plaintiffs” cannot waive the state’s right to bring its 
claim.82 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at *11. 
 77. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 392 (2014).  
 78. Id. at 360. 
 79. Id. at 386. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. at 387. 
14
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Despite this holding, the Supreme Court left open the possibility that the 
parties could arbitrate the claims.  As the Court found, the specific 
“arbitration agreement gives [the Court] no basis to assume that the parties 
would prefer to resolve a representative PAGA claim through arbitration.”83  
The Court, therefore, remanded the case so that the parties could address 
whether to arbitrate the claim.84 In the months that followed, several federal 
courts have followed the California Supreme Court’s lead and have 
compelled arbitration of these state law qui tam claims.85 
As the foregoing cases demonstrate, state and federal courts have split 
as to whether qui tam suits are arbitrable.  Yet these decisions suffer from a 
similar flaw.  In coming to opposite conclusions as to who “owns” the qui 
tam claim (or “dispute”86), courts both for and against qui tam arbitration 
have conspicuously failed to ground their analysis in Supreme Court 
precedent.  As a result, lower courts have failed to come to a principled 
answer as to whether qui tam claims are arbitrable. 
The California Supreme Court’s decision in Iskanian exemplifies the 
problem.  While the majority purported to leave open the issue of whether 
qui tam claims are arbitrable, Justice Chin concurred on the grounds that the 
majority actually foreclosed such an outcome.  As Justice Chin argued, the 
Court’s holding that qui tam claims “are not disputes between employers and 
employees” not only is a “novel theory, devoid of case law support,” but 
also would permit California to “ban arbitration of [qui tam] claims.”87  The 
concurrence thus called for the Court to “limit [itself] to an analysis firmly 
 
 83. Id. at 391. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Zenelaj v. Handybook Inc., No. 14-CV-05449-TEH, 2015 WL 971320, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 3, 2015); Martinez v. Leslie’s Poolmart, Inc., No. 8:14-CV-01481-CAS, 2014 WL 5604974, at 
*5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2014). 
 86. The term “claim” and “dispute” are synonymous.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 472 
(6th ed. 1990) (“dispute: conflict or controversy; a conflict of claims of rights; an assertion of a right 
claim or demand on one side, met by contrary claims or allegations on the other”). 
 87. Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 396 (Chin, J. concurring).  
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grounded in high court precedent, rather than needlessly adopt a novel 
theory that renders the FAA completely inapplicable.”88  Unfortunately, the 
concurrence failed to fill in that analysis.89 
This shortcoming is not inevitable.  This article is the first to provide an 
analysis, firmly grounded in high court precedent, for why qui tam claims 
are arbitrable.  As the next section of this article demonstrates, under current 
Supreme Court case law, employers can compel relators to arbitrate the qui 
tam claims, because those claims belong to relators as “partial assignees” 
under the FCA. 
IV. DEFENDANTS CAN COMPEL QUI TAM CLAIMS INTO ARBITRATION 
BECAUSE RELATORS OWN THE CLAIMS 
Despite their inconsistency, lower court decisions regarding the 
arbitrability of qui tam claims have agreed on one point.  If a relator owns 
the qui tam claim, she can be compelled into arbitration. If the Government 
owns the claim, she cannot. 
Nonetheless, decisions on both sides of the issue—as well as the 
litigants’ briefs—have failed to cite any Supreme Court jurisprudence to 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. The concurrence argues that qui tam plaintiffs have a “statutory right” to their claim.  Id. at 
395.  Further, under Supreme Court case law, a provision in an arbitration agreement may not 
“forbid[] the assertion of certain statutory rights.”  Id. (citing Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 
133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013)).  Thus, the concurrence concludes that PAGA waivers are 
unenforceable because they deny qui tam plaintiffs their statutory rights.  Id. at 396-97.  The 
concurrence, however, does not explain why—under Supreme Court case law—qui tam plaintiffs 
have a statutory right to their claim.  If a PAGA plaintiff is, as the majority and concurrence say, an 
“agent or proxy of the state,” id. at 394, then they would have no statutory rights of their own.  See 
Willcox & Gibbs Sewing-Mach. Co. v. Ewing, 141 U.S. 627, 637 (1891) (“[T]he principal has a 
right to determine or revoke the authority given to his agent at his own mere pleasure; for, since the 
authority is conferred by his mere will, and is to be executed for his own benefit and his own 
purposes, the agent cannot insist upon acting when the principal has withdrawn his confidence, and 
no longer desires his aid.”).  This article fills in the conceptual gap by arguing that qui tam plaintiffs 
have a “statutory right” as partial assignees rather than agents of the state. 
16
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support their positions on who owns a qui tam claim.  This Part fills that 
interpretive gap by looking to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on 
relators’ standing.  It is impossible to understand whether a relator owns her 
claim without knowing how she brings a claim: in other words, how a 
relator has standing.  By tracing the Supreme Court’s standing 
jurisprudence, this Part demonstrates that relators own their claims as 
“partial assignees”—and therefore can be compelled into arbitration. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Decisions on Standing Demonstrate that Relators 
Own Their Claims as Partial Assignees under the FCA 
The issue of relators’ standing goes back to the 1986 amendments to the 
FCA, which left federal courts with a constitutional problem.  Article III 
limits the judicial power of the United States to the resolution of cases and 
controversies.90  In turn, courts use the doctrine of standing to determine 
whether such a case or controversy exists.91  Standing requires several 
elements, of which one is critically important.92  The plaintiff must suffer an 
injury herself.93 
Relators, therefore, faced a constitutional dilemma.  While Congress 
authorized them to bring civil actions, the relators themselves had suffered 
no injury—and therefore needed a theory to support their standing. 
The Supreme Court put to rest the debate on how relators have Article 
III standing nearly fourteen years ago in Vermont Agency of Natural 
Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens.94  The Court rejected the 
widespread assumption, offered by appellate courts and litigants, that 
relators serve as agents of the federal government,95 holding that such an 
 
 90. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  
 91. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 92. Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979). 
 93. Id. at 100. 
 94. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772 (2000). 
 95. Id.    
17
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agency “analysis is precluded . . . by the fact that the statute gives the relator 
himself an interest in the lawsuit, and not merely the right to retain a fee out 
of the recovery.”96  This interest included the right to bring the suit “for the 
person and for the United States Government, . . . the right to continue as a 
party to the action,” even when the Government has intervened, “the right to 
a hearing before the Government’s voluntary dismissal of the suit . . . and 
the right to a judicial determination of ‘fairness, adequacy and 
reasonableness’” prior to the government settling the suit.97 
The Court found an answer to the question of the relators’ standing in 
the doctrine of partial assignment.98  As the Court concluded, “The FCA can 
reasonably be regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the 
Government’s damages claim.”99  Unlike a contract, which creates a legal 
right, an assignment transfers a legal right.100  Accordingly, a partial 
assignment is a partial transfer of a right.101  When the Government transfers 
part of its “damages claim,” the relator gains a form of “representational 
standing.”102 
This landmark holding consisted of four sentences and a footnote and 
provided no further explanation of how the FCA makes a “partial 
assignment” or what the implications of such an assignment might be.103  As 
a result, the legal literature has puzzled over the decision for over a 
decade.104  Given the Stevens decision’s brevity, it is unsurprising that 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. at 773. 
 100. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 11.3, at 58 (2d ed. 1998). 
 101. 6A C.J.S. Assignments § 129 (2013).  
 102. Stevens, 529 U.S. at 773. 
 103. Eric S. Askanase, Qui Tam and the False Claims Act: Criminal Punishment in Civil 
Disguise the Qui Tam Provisions of the FCA Are a Serious Threat to American Industry, and They 
Are Subject to Constitutional Challenges on Several Grounds, 70 DEF. COUNS. J. 472, 478 (2003). 
 104. See Nathan D. Sturycz, The King and I?: An Examination of the Interest Qui Tam Relators 
Represent and the Implications for Future False Claims Act Litigation, 28 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. 
18
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litigants and lower courts have either avoided or ignored the opinion.  
Neither federal courts nor the secondary literature on the topic of whether 
qui tam claims are arbitrable mentions Stevens or even uses the term “partial 
assignment.”105  While the California Supreme Court in Iskanian purports to 
rely on Stevens for its conclusion that state law qui tam plaintiffs are 
“agents” of the state, the Court fails to take any notice that Stevens actually 
rejected a principal-agent relationship between relators and the 
Government.106 
The plain language of Stevens and two subsequent Supreme Court 
decisions demonstrate that relators own their claims.  Based on Stevens, the 
FCA effects a partial assignment of the Government’s damages claim.107  
Such an assignment is different from a principal-agent relationship.108  A 
partial assignment fractures the Government’s single and entire claim into 
two, and transfers one of those pieces to the assignee.109  Following this 
transfer, the claim becomes the relator’s property and is her “own” claim.110  
As a result, the partial assignment becomes arbitrable. 
The Supreme Court’s later decision in Sprint Communications Co., L.P. 
v. APCC Services, Inc. confirms the interpretation that relators own their 
 
REV. 459, 470 (2009) (“[E]ven after Stevens, the relator-government relationship was hardly 
clear.”); Myriam E. Gilles, Representational Standing: U.S. Ex Rel. Stevens and the Future of Public 
Law Litigation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 315, 345 (2001).  
 105. See Alexander, supra note 15, at 1228. 
 106. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 381-82 (2014). 
 107. Stevens, 529 U.S. at 773. 
 108. U.S. ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 540 F.3d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d sub 
nom. U.S. ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928, 129 S. Ct. 2230, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1255 
(2009). 
 109. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 156 (1932) (“An assignment of either a fractional 
part of a single and entire right against an obligor . . . is operative . . . to the same extent and in the 
same manner as if the part had been a separate right.”).  
 110. Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 289 (2008) (“There is an 
important distinction between simply hiring a lawyer and assigning a claim to a lawyer (on the 
lawyer’s promise to remit litigation proceeds). The latter confers a property right (which creditors 
might attach); the former does not.”). 
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claims.  While Sprint was not itself about qui tam actions, the Court did 
address when an assignee has Article III standing.111  The Court relied on 
Stevens in holding that standing does not depend on what the plaintiff 
“ultimately intends to do with the money he recovers.”112  Rather, standing 
turns on whether the assignment transfers the assignee’s “injury in fact.”113  
As the majority explained, under the FCA, relators have standing “because 
the Act ‘effect[s] a partial assignment of the Government’s damages claim’ 
and that assignment of the ‘United States’ injury in fact suffices to confer 
standing on [the relator].’”114  Because that assignment also grants a property 
right to the assignee, the “injury in fact” becomes the assignee’s property.115  
In other words, when relators sue, they sue on their own injuries and their 
own claims—not the Government’s. 
The Sprint Court’s interpretation that the qui tam claim is a relator’s 
property cannot be explained away as dicta.  One year later, the Court 
underscored its understanding that the FCA confers a claim upon relators in 
U.S. ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York.116  There, the Court addressed 
whether the Government is a “party” in declined qui tam actions.117  By 
ruling that the Government is not a party for procedural purposes, the Court 
acknowledged that the Government is “a real party in interest” in declined 
actions.118  As the Court held, under a partial assignment, “the assignor and 
the assignee each retain an interest in the claim and both are real parties in 
 
 111. Id. at 272-73. 
 112. Id. at 286-87. 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. at 286. 
 115. Id. at 289. 
 116. U.S. ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928 (2009). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 934 (citing 6A FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1545, at 351–53 (2d ed.1990)).  
20
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interest.”119  Both entities are, therefore, actors with “substantive right[s] 
whose interests may be represented in litigation by another.”120 
Eisenstein is significant because the Court acknowledged that both 
assignors and assignees are “real parties in interest” in partial assignments.121  
By definition, a relator must own her claim to be a real party in interest.122  
A real party in interest is someone who possesses a “substantive right.”123  A 
relator would not have a “substantive right” if the FCA only granted 
whistleblowers procedural rights and a stake in the recovery.  A procedural 
right is not substantive.124  Neither is the “portion of recovery,” because that 
right does not “materialize until the litigation is completed and the relator 
prevails.”125  A relator’s substantive right must come from somewhere 
else—its piece of the FCA damages claim.  Combined, the Court’s decisions 
in Stevens, Sprint, and Eisenstein therefore point to one conclusion: a relator 
owns the qui tam claim as a partial assignee of the Government’s injury and 
claim, and this is evidenced by the fact that relators are real parties in 
interest in qui tam suits. 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 934-35.  Nonetheless, because status as a “real party in interest” is not necessarily 
synonymous with status as a “party,” the Court ruled that the Government was not a “party” in 
declined actions.  Id. at 937. 
 121. The Court refers to the Government four times as “a real party in interest.”  Id. at 930, 
934-35.  The use of the indefinite article (“a real party in interest”) is important because it denotes 
that there are two real parties in interest rather than one.  See U.S. ex rel. Laird v. Lockheed Martin 
Eng’g & Sci. Servs. Co., 336 F.3d 346, 358 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Texas Tech Univ., 171 
F.3d 279, 295 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 122. See 1 F. R. CIV. P., RULES AND COMMENTARY RULE 17. 
 123. Eisenstein, 556 U.S. at 934-35. 
 124. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1437 (9th ed. 2009) (“procedural right: A right that derives 
from legal or administrative procedure; a right that helps in the protection or enforcement of a 
substantive right”); see id. at 1438 (“substantive right: A right that can be protected or enforced by 
law; a right of substance rather than form”).  A right to relief is a procedural right.  Chapman v. 
Hous. Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979). 
 125. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773 (2000). 
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A. The Lower Courts’ Jurisprudence on Pre-Filing Releases Confirm that 
Relators Can Contract Away Their Qui Tam Claims 
The view that relators own the qui tam claims is consistent with how 
courts have treated qui tam suits in other contexts.  For nearly twenty years, 
lower courts across ten circuits have held that relators can sell their qui tam 
claims to third parties.126  These transactions, called “pre-filing releases,” 
occur when a relator assigns her claim to a third party rather than filing a 
complaint.127  These sales are rarely made to disinterested entities.  
Ordinarily, a relator sells the action to the defendant for a substantial sum.128  
Because a defendant will not bring suit against itself, the sale effectively 
settles the relator’s claim. 
Such settlements invalidate the theory that the Government owns the qui 
tam claims.129  While only a handful of courts have cited Stevens, those that 
have made the leap have recognized that relators own their claims.  As the 
courts have ruled, under Stevens, “Article III standing in qui tam cases is 
founded in a statutory assignment of the government’s injury-in-fact to the 
 
 126. United States ex rel. Radcliffe v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 600 F.3d 319, 326 (4th Cir. 2010); 
United States ex rel. Ritchie v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 558 F.3d 1161, 1168 (10th Cir. 2009); 
United States ex rel. Longhi v. Lithium Power Techs., Inc., 575 F.3d 458, 474 (5th Cir. 2009); 
United States ex rel. Gebert v. Transp. Admin. Servs., 260 F.3d 909, 916 (8th Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 965 (9th Cir. 1995); U.S. ex rel. Powell v. Am. 
InterContinental Univ., Inc., 2012 WL 2885356 (N.D. Ga. July 12, 2012); U.S. ex rel. McNulty v. 
Reddy Ice Holdings, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 2d 341, 361 (E.D. Mich. 2011); U.S. ex rel. Nowak v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 2d 310, 337 (D. Mass. 2011); U.S. ex rel. Longhi v. Lithium Power 
Techs., Inc., 481 F. Supp. 2d 815, 818 (S.D. Tex. 2007); U.S. ex rel. El-Amin v. George Washington 
Univ., 2007 WL 1302597 (D.D.C. May 2, 2007); see Brown v. City of S. Burlington, 393 F.3d 337, 
338 (2d Cir. 2004) (analyzing a pre-filing release related to a qui tam action under contract law but 
allowing the case to go to trial to determine whether the release had been obtained under duress).  
 127. A release is an assignment of a claim from the plaintiff to the defendant.  See BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1315 (8th ed. 2004) (“release: the act of giving up a right or claim to the person 
against whom it could have been enforced”).  
 128. Id. 
 129. See Gebert, 260 F.3d at 913. 
22
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relator.”130  As such, a pre-filing release “divests the relator of the ability to 
retain an injury-in-fact assignment from the United States” and renders the 
“relator’s right to the claim (including any money damages) . . . the property 
of the [recipient’s] estate.”131  The few other courts considering Stevens in 
the context of pre-filing releases have come to the same conclusion—the 
relator owns the claim.132  Indeed, pre-filing releases could not exist 
otherwise; if the Government owned the qui tam claim, the relator would 
have nothing to release. 
B. Lower Court Decisions Rejecting Relator Ownership Have 
Misinterpreted Supreme Court Precedent 
Despite the Second and Ninth Circuits’ decisions enforcing pre-filing 
releases,133 the two appellate courts have issued contradictory opinions on 
who owns the qui tam claims.  Both circuits have held that relators may not 
sue pro se because they do not own the qui tam claims.134  These holdings 
came in the course of interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1654, which governs when 
parties may proceed without legal counsel.135  Since the statute allows 
parties suing without counsel to “plead and conduct their own cases,”136 a 
 
 130. Id. at 914. 
 131. Id. (emphasis added). 
 132. Purdue, 600 F.3d at 329 (“[O]nce the government suffered an injury (and [the relator] 
became aware of the fraud causing the injury), [the relator] had a statutory claim, and the necessary 
legal standing as partial assignee, to file a qui tam lawsuit.”); Ritchie, 558 F.3d at 1167 (“[The 
relator] argues the FCA claims are not claims she ‘might have’ because they belong to the United 
States. This argument is undercut by the language of the FCA and by Supreme Court precedent.”); 
Longhi, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 823 (“Contrary to relator’s claim that the action does not belong to 
relator, the Fifth Circuit has expressly held that relator is a party to the suit.”).  
 133. Northrop, 59 F.3d at 965; see Brown, 393 F.3d at 338. 
 134. U.S. ex rel. Mergent Servs. v. Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2008); Stoner v. Santa 
Clara Cnty. Office of Educ., 502 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 2007).  
 135. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2012).  
 136. Mergent Servs., 540 F.3d at 92 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1654). 
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relator suing pro se must demonstrate that she is “litigating an interest 
personal to h[er].”137 
Like the few courts in their pre-filing release jurisprudence, the Second 
and Ninth Circuits have looked to Stevens to adjudicate the question of qui 
tam claims ownership.  The two circuits, however, have come to a different 
outcome.  Both have concluded that, while a relator is a partial assignee in a 
qui tam suit, “the injury . . . belongs to the United States.”138  So while the 
FCA partially assigns to relators certain “procedural guarantees” and a 
portion of the recovery,139 “[t]he claim itself belongs to the United States.”140  
As further evidence of this proposition, the courts have pointed to the text of 
the FCA, which provides that “the Government may elect to pursue its claim 
through any alternate remedy.”141  Because relators do not own their claims, 
the courts have concluded that relators must also lack the personal interest 
required to proceed pro se.142 
As these decisions demonstrate, the Second and Ninth Circuits have 
interpreted Stevens as distinguishing the assignment of a “claim” from the 
assignment of a “damages claim.”  While a partial assignment of the “claim” 
grants a property right in the Government’s injury in fact, a partial 
assignment of the “damages claim” grants procedural rights and a monetary 
bounty.  This reading, however, is attenuated.  A “claim” is a right to 
relief.143  Thus, a damages claim is a right to relief for damages. By stating 
that the FCA partially assigns the “Government’s damages claim,” the 
 
 137. Id. (quoting Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2d Cir. 1998)).  
 138. Id. at 93 (citing Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774-75 
(2000)); Stoner, 502 F.3d at 1127 (quoting Stevens, 529 U.S. at 771 (The relator “is suing to remedy 
an injury in fact suffered by the United States.”)).  
 139. Stoner, 502 F.3d at 1127 (citing Stevens, 529 U.S. at 772)).   
 140. Mergent Servs., 540 F.3d at 93. 
 141. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(5)); Stoner, 502 F.3d at 1126 (citing 
same).  
 142. Mergent Servs., 540 F.3d at 93; Stoner, 502 F.3d at 1126. 
 143. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 282 (9th ed. 2009) (“claim: the part of a complaint in a civil 
action specify what relief the plaintiff asks”).  
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Supreme Court did not mean that the Act assigns a “portion of the proceeds” 
and a “cause of action.”  Rather, it meant that the FCA partially assigns the 
Government’s legal claim to damages, rather than the Government’s 
equitable claim for injunctive relief.144  Basic principles of assignment law 
confirm this interpretation.  While the Government can assign its proprietary 
rights to private individuals, it cannot assign its sovereign rights.145  In turn, 
non-pecuniary rights (e.g. injunctions) are sovereign rights.146  The court in 
Stevens was therefore distinguishing proprietary rights from sovereign rights 
when it used the phrase “damages claim,” not between claims and non-
claims. 
The FCA’s statutory text is not contrary to Stevens.  The lower courts in 
their pro se jurisprudence are correct that the FCA states that “the 
Government may elect to pursue its claim through any alternative 
remedy.”147  Nonetheless, a partial assignment effectively fractures a single 
and entire right into two.148  The text of the FCA therefore establishes that 
the Government can pursue “its claim” through alternative remedies—not 
that the Government owns the relator’s suit. 
The Supreme Court’s later decisions in Sprint and Eisenstein 
demonstrate this point.  If the FCA both assigns the Government’s injury in 
fact (Sprint) and turns the relator into a real party in interest (Eisenstein), the 
relator must also own the claim.149  The Second and Ninth Circuit opinions 
are therefore unsupported by either the text of Stevens or the Supreme 
Court’s subsequent decisions on relators’ standing. 
C. Because Relators Own Qui Tam Claims, Relators Can Also Be 
 
 144. Gilles, supra note 104, at 344 (“Under the traditional formulation of assignment . . . claims 
seeking to vindicate the government’s non-proprietary, sovereign interests are not assignable.”).  
 145. Id.  
 146. See id.  
 147. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(5) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 148. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 156 (1932). 
 149. Supra Section III.A. 
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Compelled into Arbitration 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Stevens, Sprint, and Eisenstein 
establish that the FCA partially assigns both the Government’s injury and 
claim to relators.  A relator bringing a qui tam claim, therefore, does not sue 
on the Government’s rights.  Rather, the relator’s partial assignment 
functions as if it “had been a separate right” from that of the Government.150  
As a result, when a relator sues under the FCA, it is as if she sues on her 
own injuries and her own claims.151  Under Supreme Court precedent, the 
relator-partial assignee has a property right over the claim and can sell, or 
otherwise limit her expression of that right, through contract.152  Given these 
circumstances, it follows that a relator can agree to arbitrate her claim.  After 
all, arbitration is a form of contract.153 
The fact that the Government is a “real party in interest” to the relator’s 
qui tam suit does not change this outcome.  There is no rule that prevents 
arbitration when there are multiple real parties in interest.154  Instead, the 
rule is that arbitrators may only adjudicate the claims of the parties to the 
 
 150. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 156 (1932). 
 151. See id.  
 152. Supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 153. Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010). 
 154. See Sauer v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 668 F.3d 644, 650 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the 
Department of Education could engage in arbitration even though real party in interest to the suit 
was not included as a party); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 330 F.3d 843, 849 (6th Cir. 
2003) (holding that the real party in interest that had signed the arbitration agreement could be 
compelled into arbitration, but that arbitrators could not bind a real party in interest that was a non-
signatory); Tuminello v. Richards, No. C11-5928BHS, 2012 WL 750305, at *2-3 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 
8, 2012), aff’d, 504 F. App’x 557 (9th Cir. 2013) (ruling that plaintiff could proceed into arbitration 
even though there were other unnamed, real parties in interest to the suit); Data-Stream AS/RS 
Techs., LLC v. China Int’l Marine Containers, Ltd., No. 02 Civ. 6530 (JFK), 2003 WL 22519456 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2003) (ruling that assignor could proceed into arbitration even though assignee 
was a real party in interest and not captioned in the suit); In re Chi-Chi’s, Inc., 338 B.R. 618, 627 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (finding that one real party in interest could pursue its claim in arbitration 
even though the other real party in interest brought its claim in court). 
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arbitration.155  Under lower court precedent, defendants can compel a 
relator’s qui tam claim into arbitration, and arbitrators can dismiss the 
relator’s action.156  Yet if the Government is not a party to the arbitration, 
arbitrators cannot dismiss the Government’s claims.157 
This standard makes sense.  Arbitration is a creature of contract and 
subject to the same limitations as other contractual agreements.158  As 
previously noted, a relator can contract to sell her qui tam claim even though 
the Government is a real party in interest.159  A relator cannot, however, 
purport to sell the Government’s claim.160  By analogy, it follows that a 
relator can arbitrate her qui tam claim despite the Government’s interest in 
the suit.  Given the Supreme Court’s admonition that the FAA “places 
arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts,”161 it would 
be contradictory to hold that the Government’s status permits relators to sell 
their claims (to the very defendant’s that are alleged to have committed 
fraud) but bars relators from arbitrating them.162 
Finally, the understanding that relators “own” their qui tam claims does 
not conflict with the maxim that relators sue “on behalf of” the 
Government.”163  The text of the FCA does not use the language “on behalf 
of.”  Rather, the FCA states that a relator “bring[s] a[n] action . . . for the 
person and for the United States.”164  A relator suing on its own claim does 
precisely that.  When a relator brings an action, both the person and the 
 
 155. Nationwide, 330 F.3d at 848-49. 
 156. See id. 
 157. See id. 
 158. Rent-A-Ctr., 561 U.S. at 67. 
 159. Supra Section III.B. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Rent-A-Ctr., 561 U.S. at 67. 
 162. To the extent that there are unique public policy reasons for rejecting arbitration, those 
reasons are confined to the circumstances addressed in Part VI of this article. 
 163. Stevens, 529 U.S. at 787. 
 164. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2012). 
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United States become real parties in interest to the suit.165  A relator then 
sues “on behalf of” the Government because she remedies an injury that is 
identical to one suffered by the state—not because the relator legally serves 
as the Government’s “representative” in the qui tam action.166 
In sum, the understanding that relators own their claims is consistent 
with Supreme Court jurisprudence and the broader field of qui tam law.  As 
the next part of this article demonstrates, before defendants can compel qui 
tam claims into arbitration, they must also prove that relators have agreed to 
arbitrate their claims by signing arbitration clauses.  While the circuits use 
three different tests to determine whether this is the case, relators’ claims 
likely fall within the contractual scope of their arbitration clauses under each 
test. 
V. QUI TAM CLAIMS FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF RELATORS’ ARBITRATION 
CLAUSES AS A MATTER OF CONTRACTUAL INTERPRETATION 
Corporate defendants must do more than demonstrate that relators own 
the qui tam claims in order to compel arbitration.  They must also show that 
the qui tam claims fall within the scope of relators’ arbitration clauses.  
Because arbitration is a matter of contract, a court cannot compel arbitration 
 
 165. See U.S. ex rel. Laird v. Lockheed Martin Eng’g & Sci. Servs. Co., 336 F.3d 346, 358 (5th 
Cir. 2003); U.S. ex rel. Long v. SCS Bus. & Tech. Inst., Inc., 173 F.3d 870, 883-84, supplemented, 
173 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (interpreting the phrase “for the person and for the United States” to 
mean that relators and the government are real parties in interest); United States v. Texas Tech 
Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 289-90 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 166. See E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 298 (2002) (holding that the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) could bring a claim “on behalf of” a private 
employee even though the agency did not act in any representative capacity).  Furthermore, the 
FCA’s requirement that a relator bring the claim “in the name of the Government” is immaterial.  31 
U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1).  The question of in whose name an action must be brought is procedural, not 
substantive.  6A FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1544 (3d ed. 1988).  Thus, the naming requirement has 
no bearing on whether a relator has a substantive right (e.g., an injury and a claim). 
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of a dispute that the parties have not agreed to arbitrate.167  It is up to the 
courts to determine in the first instance whether an arbitration clause covers 
a particular claim.168  This part shows that qui tam claims fall within the 
scope of standard arbitration clauses. 
As an initial matter, defendants are already taking a simple measure to 
ensure that arbitration clauses cover FCA claims; namely, including qui tam 
suits in the list of disputes covered by the arbitration clause.169  Boilerplate 
arbitration agreements now include language covering “private attorney 
general” actions:170 another name for qui tam actions.171  Under such 
circumstances, courts cannot avoid compelling a relator’s qui tam claim into 
arbitration.  As the Supreme Court has held, “Absent some ambiguity in the 
agreement . . . it is the language of the contract that defines the scope of 
disputes subject to arbitration.”172  Explicitly specifying “private attorney 
general” or “qui tam” claims removes any such ambiguity. 
Given that arbitration clauses have retroactive effect,173 defendants in 
the coming years can easily amend their employees’ contracts to include the 
new terms.  Of course, whistleblowers with pending qui tam claims would 
likely object.  But if forced to choose between a judicial forum and 
continued employment, relators might very well sign the new contracts.174 
 
 167. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960). 
 168. AT&T Techs, Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 651 (1986). 
 169. Scott v. TitleMax of S.C. Inc., Civ. Action No. 3:09-1032-CMC-JRM, 2012 WL 393365 
(D.S.C. Jan. 17, 2012); Magee v. Advance Am. Servicing of Ark., Inc., No. 608-cv-6105, 2009 WL 
890991 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 1, 2009).  
 170. Id. 
 171. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Branch Consultants v. Allstate Ins. Co., 560 F.3d 371, 376 (5th Cir. 
2009). 
 172. E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002).  
 173. Levin v. Alms & Assocs., Inc., 634 F.3d 260, 268 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 174. Firing the relator for not signing the new agreement would likely not give rise to a 
colorable retaliation claim.  Buboltz v. Residential Advantages, Inc., 523 F.3d 864, 869 (8th Cir. 
2008), abrogated on other grounds by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(rejecting claim of retaliation because policy change “required all employees to work every other 
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As the rest of this part demonstrates, even if corporate defendants do not 
uniformly adopt the naming or retroactive application strategy, qui tam 
claims would still fall within the language of standard arbitration clauses.  A 
relator’s arbitration clause generally says that the parties agree to arbitrate 
“[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this [employment] 
Agreement or the breach thereof.”175  As the appellate courts have 
recognized, this language “is the paradigm of a broad clause.”176  Thus, 
courts have limited discretion to deny arbitration because all doubts must be 
resolved in favor of arbitrability.177  As a result, relators face an uphill battle 
in proving their qui tam suits do not “relate to” their employment 
agreements and, therefore, fall outside the scope of relators’ arbitration 
clauses. 
Presently, only a handful of courts have gotten far enough in their 
analysis to determine whether qui tam claims “relate to” relators’ arbitration 
clauses.178  Those that have addressed the issue have split into two lines of 
thought.  As one line of decisions has held, qui tam claims “in no way” 
relate to a relator’s “employee status,” because even if the relator “had never 
been employed by defendants, assuming other conditions were met, the 
relator would still be able to bring a suit against them for presenting false 
claims to the government.”179  In other words, relators’ qui tam claims fall 
outside of the scope of their contracts because under a set of hypothetical 
facts, relators could still file their claims. 
 
weekend”); Uddin v. City of New York, 427 F. Supp. 2d 414, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding no 
adverse action where all employees were subjected to the same change in company policy).  
 175. E.g., Orcutt v. Kettering Radiologists, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 746, 753 (S.D. Ohio 2002) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 176. Collins & Aikman Prod. Co. v. Bldg. Sys., Inc., 58 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 177. AT&T, 475 U.S. at 650. 
 178. Mikes v. Strauss, 889 F. Supp. 746, 754 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Deck v. Miami Jacobs Bus. 
Coll. Co., 2013 WL 394875, at *6-7 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2013); Cunningham v. Leslie’s Poolmart, 
Inc., 2013 WL 3233211, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2013). 
 179. Mikes, 889 F. Supp. at 754. 
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In contrast, the district courts in favor of qui tam arbitration have 
focused on the fact that qui tam claims (and their PAGA equivalents) 
“belong[] to the [p]laintiffs themselves.”180  As the courts reasoned, qui tam 
claims are “nothing more” than “claim[s] that [the plaintiffs] may have 
against the Company” and “should be compelled” into arbitration.181 
Neither of these explanations is persuasive because they ignore that 
circuit courts have very specific tests for determining the scope of arbitration 
clauses.  Indeed, the aforementioned decisions concerning qui tam 
arbitration fail to cite a single appellate decision for their conclusions.  
Presently, the courts of appeals utilize at least three different formulae for 
determining when a claim “relates to” an employment agreement.182  Under 
each of the configurations, qui tam claims would be arbitrable. 
A. Qui Tam Claims Require Relators to Make Factual Allegations Relating 
To Their Employment Contracts 
The majority of circuit courts use a similar test to determine when a 
dispute “relates to” the parties’ employment contract. A dispute falls within 
the parties’ arbitration agreement if the factual allegations underlying the 
claim “touch matters in”183 or “significantly relate to”184 the employment 
contract.  Circuits employing the factual allegations standard look to the 
facts actually pled in the complaint and whether those facts reference the 
 
 180. Deck, 2013 WL 394875, at *6-7; see Cunningham, 2013 WL 3233211, at *7-8. 
 181. Cunningham, 2013 WL 3233211, at *11. 
 182. Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. Johannesburg Consol. Invs., 553 F.3d 1351, 1366-69 (11th 
Cir. 2008). 
 183. 3M Co. v. Amtex Sec., Inc., 542 F.3d 1193, 1199 (8th Cir. 2008); Genesco, Inc. v. T. 
Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840, 846 (2d Cir. 1987).  
 184. Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 721 (9th Cir. 1999); Am. Recovery Corp. v. 
Computerized Thermal Imaging, Inc., 96 F.3d 88, 93 (4th Cir. 1996).  The Seventh Circuit’s 
standard is also synonymous with the “significant relationship” test.  Gore v. Alltel Commc’ns, LLC, 
666 F.3d 1027, 1033 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Kiefer Specialty Flooring, Inc. v. Tarkett, Inc., 174 
F.3d 907, 909 (7th Cir. 1999)). 
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plaintiff’s employment agreement.185  Under these circumstances, it is 
unlikely that relators could avoid arbitration. 
To begin, relators must provide significant information about their 
employment status in order to plead fraud with particularity under Rule 9(b) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The reason is that a relator’s insider 
status significantly enhances the reliability of her accusations.186  Courts 
have thus required relators to “give[] precise and credible information on 
how [they] know[] what [they] allege,”187 including where they were 
employed, how long they had worked there, the scope of their professional 
duties, whether they had company-wide access to files, whom they 
supervised, and who supervised them.188  In this respect, the inquiry in a qui 
tam suit is much like that in a trade secret dispute, where courts examine 
how the parties “gained access to the . . . information” claimed to be 
confidential.189  Under such circumstances, the courts have held that disputes 
fall within the scope of arbitration clauses, because the employee “would not 
have had access to the alleged . . . information but for the employment 
relationship with [the company].”190  This same rationale applies to qui tam 
suits, and demonstrates that qui tam claims fall within the scope of relators’ 
employment agreements. 
 
 185. Stimula, 175 F.3d at 721; Am. Recovery Corp., 96 F.3d at 93; see Gore, 666 F.3d at 1036; 
3M Co, 542 F.3d at 1199; Genesco, 815 F.2d at 846. 
 186. Atkins, 470 F.3d at 1359; Clausen, 290 F.3d at 1314. 
 187. U.S. ex rel. Lockhart v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1341 (N.D. Fla. 
2007). 
 188. Id.; U.S. ex rel. Atkins v. McInteer, 470 F.3d 1350, 1359 (11th Cir. 2006); Hill v. 
Morehouse Med. Assocs., Inc., No. 02-14429, 2003 WL 22019936 (11th Cir. Aug. 15, 2003); U.S. 
ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., Inc., 290 F.3d 1301, 1314 (11th Cir. 2002); see Corsello v. 
Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d 1008, 1014 (11th Cir. 2005) (dismissing on 9(b) grounds where relator 
“conceded that he ‘did not have access to company files outside his own offices’”); see also Yuhasz 
v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 341 F.3d 559, 567 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing portions of relator’s complaint 
outlining relator’s duties).  
 189. Coors Brewing Co. v. Molson Breweries, 51 F.3d 1511, 1517-18 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 190. GATX Mgmt. Servs., LLC v. Weakland, 171 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1165 (D. Colo. 2001). 
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Additionally, even if relators could meet Rule 9(b)’s requirements 
without providing such facts, savvy defendants could induce relators to 
amend their complaints to include information “relating to” their 
employment agreements (and force relators to arbitrate). In particular, 
defendants would raise one of the most commonly litigated issues in qui tam 
claims: the public disclosure bar.191  The FCA bars suits where facts about 
the fraud have been publicly disclosed and the relator is not an original 
source of the information.192  To prove that he or she is an original source, a 
relator must plead facts showing that she (1) “has direct and independent 
knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based”; and (2) 
“has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing an 
action.”193  These requirements give artful defendants an opportunity to force 
relators to reference their employment agreements and trigger the arbitration 
clauses that govern employment disputes. 
A defendant might do so in the following manner: after the relator files 
her initial complaint, the defendant would file only a motion to dismiss (and 
not a motion to compel arbitration).  Within the motion to dismiss, the 
defendant would argue that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 
because the alleged frauds have already been publicly disclosed.  The 
defendant would further allege that the relator is not an “original source” for 
two reasons.  First, the relator could not have had “direct and independent 
knowledge” of the alleged fraud because her job responsibilities did not give 
her access to the relevant documents and personnel.194  Second, the relator 
 
 191. James B. Helmer, Jr., False Claims Act: Incentivizing Integrity for 150 Years for Rogues, 
Privateers, Parasites and Patriots, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1261, 1274 (2013). 
 192. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2012); Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 
467 (2007) (holding that § 3730(e)(4) “eliminates federal-court jurisdiction over actions”).  
 193. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 549 U.S. at 467. 
 194. Prather v. AT&T Inc., 2013 WL 5947131 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2013); see U.S. ex rel. 
Aflatooni v. Kitsap Physicians Servs., 163 F.3d 516, 524-25 (9th Cir. 1999) (The Court previously 
dismissed a suit where the relators “did not discover firsthand the information underlying their 
allegations of fraud.  They did not see the fraud with their own eyes or obtain their knowledge of it 
through their own labor unmediated by anything else.”).  
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did not “voluntarily” make her submission, because the terms of the relator’s 
employment require her to disclose potential frauds to the government (such 
as an auditor agreement).195  In either case, the relator would have to plead 
facts from her employment agreement relating to her professional 
responsibilities,196 and amend her complaint.197  As soon as the relator does, 
the defendant would file a motion to compel arbitration based on the new 
factual allegations.198 
In short, whether by intention or by clever lawyering, relators in qui tam 
suits must demonstrate how they obtained their information about the 
alleged frauds.  This will often require relators to allege facts that “touch 
matters in” or “significantly relate to” their employment contracts, and 
would be sufficient to meet the standard for arbitrability in the majority of 
circuits. 
 
 195. U.S. ex rel. Biddle v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ., 161 F.3d 533, 541 (9th 
Cir. 1998) (holding that although the relator was not an auditor, her job duties “included some 
aspects of such work”); U.S. ex rel. Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 72 F.3d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1995); 
U.S. ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., Inc., 913 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that relator was 
not an “original source” where “it was [relator’s] responsibility, a condition of his employment, to 
uncover fraud”); U.S. ex rel. Foust v. Grp. Hospitalization & Med. Servs., 26 F. Supp. 2d 60, 74 
(D.D.C. 1998); Wercinski v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 982 F. Supp. 449, 461 (S.D. Tex. 1997); see 
U.S. ex rel. Paranich v. Sorgnard, 396 F.3d 326, 340 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Fine, 72 F.3d at 743).  
 196. Biddle, 161 F.3d at 541; Fine, 72 F.3d at 743; LeBlanc, 913 F.2d at 20; U.S. ex rel. 
Merena v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 114 F. Supp. 2d 352, 361 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Foust, 26 F. Supp. 
2d at 74; Wercinski, 982 F. Supp. at 461. 
 197. Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Altman Specialty Plants, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 7504(PGG), 2009 WL 
222158, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2009). 
 198. Filing a motion to dismiss does not waive a parties’ right to compel arbitration.  Sharif v. 
Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd., 376 F.3d 720, 726-27 (7th Cir. 2004); Williams v. Cigna Fin. 
Advisors, Inc., 56 F.3d 656, 661-62 (5th Cir. 1995); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F.2d 885, 888 
(2nd Cir. 1985); Lake Commc’ns, Inc. v. ICC Corp., 738 F.2d 1473, 1477 (9th Cir. 1984).  
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B. Relators’ Qui Tam Claims Are a Foreseeable Result of Relator’s 
Contractual Duties 
The second standard, adopted by a minority of circuits, establishes that a 
claim “relates to” an employment agreement where it is “an immediate, 
foreseeable result of the performance of contractual duties.”199  Under this 
approach, the court asks whether “the dispute occur[ed] as a fairly direct 
result of the performance of [the plaintiff’s] contractual duties,” such as the 
plaintiff’s role as a supervisor of the defendant or its employees.200 
Relators’ qui tam claims easily meet this foreseeability analysis.  
Relators ordinarily obtain evidence about alleged frauds “as a fairly direct 
result” of their contractual duties as supervisors and supervisees.201  Indeed, 
the relators in some instances even participate in the fraud.202  Of course, 
non-employees could theoretically submit qui tam claims. But these 
instances are rare and often discouraged by the courts.203  For the most part, 
if the relator had never worked for the company, she would never have 
discovered the alleged frauds and could not have filed suit. 
C. Qui Tam Claims Are Likely Legally Dependent on Relators’ Employment 
Contracts 
The final test, adopted by the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, offers relators the 
best opportunity to escape their arbitration clauses.  Instead of focusing on 
 
 199. Telecom Italia, SpA v. Wholesale Telecom Corp., 248 F.3d 1109, 1116 (11th Cir. 2001); 
see Becker Autoradio U.S.A., Inc. v. Becker Autoradiowerk GmbH, 585 F.2d 39, 46 (3d Cir. 1978). 
 200. Telecom Italia, SpA, 248 F.3d, at 1116. 
 201. U.S. ex rel. Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 72 F.3d 740, 741 (9th Cir. 1995); see U.S. ex 
rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 420, 441 (E.D. Pa. 1998). 
 202. U.S. ex rel. Johnson v. Golden Gate Nat. Senior Care, LLC, 2012 WL 465676 (D. Minn. 
Feb. 13, 2012); U.S. ex rel. Lockhart v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1341 (N.D. 
Fla. 2007). 
 203. See U.S. ex rel. Atkins v. McInteer, 470 F.3d 1350, 1359 (11th Cir. 2006); U.S. ex rel. 
Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., Inc., 290 F.3d 1301, 1314 (11th Cir. 2002). 
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“whether the complaint happens to reference the contract,” this test looks to 
whether the elements of the plaintiff’s claim are “legally dependent on . . . 
the underlying contract.”204  In other words, the two circuits look to whether 
“an action could be maintained without reference to the contract or 
relationship at issue.”205  Relators have a persuasive argument under this 
standard that complying with Rule 9(b) is insufficient to warrant 
arbitration.206  Pleading requirements are a procedural rule and not an actual 
element of the plaintiff’s claim.207  Thus, while a complaint may happen to 
reference the relator’s employment contract in order to plead fraud with 
particularity, this alone is insufficient to warrant arbitration. 
Nonetheless, relators cannot evade arbitration should defendants raise 
the public disclosure bar, because the elements of an original source defense 
are legally dependent on the relator’s employment responsibilities. In turn, it 
is unlikely that a relator could prove her employment responsibilities 
without reference to his or her employment contract.  A person’s 
employment status is an individual matter of contract, and the Sixth Circuit 
has often turned to employment agreements to determine a party’s 
professional responsibilities before compelling arbitration.208  Given this 
 
 204. Ford v. NYLcare Health Plans of the Gulf Coast, Inc., 141 F.3d 243, 250-51 (5th Cir. 
1998); Fazio v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 340 F.3d 386, 395 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 205. Fazio, 340 F.3d at 395. 
 206. Id. 
 207. U.S. ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 389 F.3d 1251, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(quoting U.S. ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1386 (D.C.Cir.1981) (holding that “Rule 
9(b) is not . . . to be read in isolation from other procedural canons.”)); Richard D. Greenfield & 
Robin Resnick, Rule 9(b): Docket Control Device or Safeguard Against Charges of Fraud?, in NEW 
DIMENSIONS IN SECURITIES LITIGATION: PLANNING & STRATEGIES 707, 715 (1992), available at 
C751 ALI-ABA 707.  
 
 208. See Panepucci v. Honigman Miller Schwartz & Cohn LLP, 281 F. App’x 482, 487-88 (6th 
Cir. 2008) (holding that court could not determine whether a plaintiff qualified as an “employee” 
under anti-discrimination laws without looking at her arbitration agreement); Fazio v. Lehman Bros., 
Inc., 340 F.3d 386, 395 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding fraud claim could not be adjudicating without 
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precedent, relators face an uphill battle to show that they have “direct and 
independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are 
based” and have “voluntarily provided the information to the Government” 
without providing documentation of their employment contracts.  Thus, 
while the “without reference” standard offers relators the best opportunity to 
evade arbitration, defendants can still likely compel relators into arbitration 
no matter the circuit, as relators’ qui tam claims “relate to” their employment 
contracts and are therefore arbitrable. 
VI. QUI TAM ARBITRATION COULD UNDERMINE ENFORCEMENT OF THE FCA 
As this article demonstrates, relators not only own their claims, but 
those claims also ordinarily fall within the scope of relators’ arbitration 
clauses.  As with any statutory claim, however, qui tam actions cannot be 
compelled into arbitration if Congress has “evinced an intention to preclude 
a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.”209  “If such an 
intention exists, it will be discoverable in the text of the [FCA], its 
legislative history, or an ‘inherent conflict’ between arbitration and the 
[FCA]’s underlying purposes.”210  As demonstrated below, by failing to add 
anti-retaliation provisions to the FCA when it passed the Dodd-Frank Act in 
2010, Congress has implicitly—and detrimentally—authorized arbitration of 
qui tam suits. 
Congress understood the perils of arbitration when it overhauled its 
whistleblower statutes following the financial crisis.  As part of the Dodd-
Frank Act of 2010, Congress amended four different statutes to prohibit 
arbitration of whistleblower suits brought under the acts.211  While Congress 
 
describing “why [the defendant] was in control of the plaintiffs’ money and what the [the 
defendant’s] obligations were”).  
 209. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (citing Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)).  
 210. Id. 
 211. See statutes supra note 5.  
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concurrently amended the FCA, it did not add an anti-arbitration provision 
for qui tam claims.212 
The legislative history of Dodd-Frank never clarified why Congress 
amended only the four statutes to include anti-arbitration provisions and not 
the FCA.  The Senate Report on Dodd-Frank states more generally that 
arbitration often “is unfair” because it involves “high upfront costs, limited 
access to documents and other key information, limited knowledge upon 
which to base the choice of arbitrator, the absence of a requirement that 
arbitrators follow the law or issue written decisions, and extremely limited 
grounds for appeal.”213 
Despite Congress’s generalized concern, lower courts have refused to 
read Dodd-Frank’s prohibition on arbitration to encompass the FCA or other 
federal statutes.214  As the canon of statutory interpretation dictates, “When 
Congress amends one statutory provision but not another, it is presumed to 
have acted intentionally.”215  Courts, therefore, held that Congress forwent 
its opportunity to prevent FCA claims from being arbitrated, by 
strengthening the FCA’s anti-retaliation measures without also adding anti-
arbitration provisions.216 
 
 212. James v. Conceptus, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1029 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (“Dodd–Frank’s 
antiarbitration amendments to other statutes cannot be extended by implication to the antiretaliation 
provisions of the False Claims Act, especially when Dodd–Frank amended other parts of the False 
Claims Act but not the provision at issue.”). 
 213. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 110 (2010) (quoting AARP, Letter to Senators Dodd and Shelby, 
November 19, 2009). 
 214. Holmes v. Air Liquide USA, L.L.C., 498 F. App’x 405, 407 (5th Cir. 2012) (declining to 
extend anti-arbitration provision to the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Texas Commission on 
Human Rights Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Family and Medical Leave 
Act); Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, 2014 WL 285093 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2014) (declining to extent 
anti-arbitration provision to retaliation provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley); Beard v. Santander Consumer 
USA, Inc., 2012 WL 1292576, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2012) (declining to extent anti-arbitration 
provision to Servicemembers Civil Relief Act); James, 851 F.Supp.2d at 1029. 
 215. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009); see Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 
U.S. 243, 267 (2006) (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)). 
 216. James, 851 F.Supp.2d at 1029. 
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Congress’s failure to amend the FCA cannot be explained away on the 
grounds that the statute already prohibited arbitration.  The standard for 
establishing a congressional intent against arbitration based on a statute’s 
text or legislative history is a weighty one.  As the Supreme Court has held, 
a plaintiff must show that “the text of the [statute] or its legislative history 
explicitly precludes arbitration.”217  The text of the FCA is largely silent on 
the issue.  While the act states that any action “may be brought in any 
judicial district,”218 courts have long recognized that the word “may” does 
not require that actions be brought in a judicial forum.219  Similarly, the act 
provides that an “action may be dismissed only if the court and the Attorney 
General give written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for 
consenting.”220  Nonetheless, a motion to compel arbitration is distinct from 
a motion to dismiss.  The former stays court proceedings for the duration of 
the arbitration;221 the latter terminates the action without further hearing.222  
While courts have never addressed the issue, the FCA does not appear to 
require the Attorney General to consent to arbitration of a qui tam claim. 
The legislative history of the FCA is equally silent on arbitration.  The 
words “arbitrate” or “arbitration” appear three times in the legislative 
materials surrounding the 1986 Amendments: (1) in a copy of a boilerplate 
arbitration agreement;223 (2) in a written submission from a Los Angeles 
 
 217. Id. 
 218. 31 U.S.C. § 3732 (2012). 
 219. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991).  
 220. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b). 
 221. Teressa L. Elliott, Responsibility of the Courts in Motions to Compel Arbitration, 32 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 89, 94 (2006). 
 222. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 482 (7th ed. 1999). 
 223. Federal Securities Laws and Defense Contracting—Part 1, Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, House 
of Representatives, 99th Cong. 581 (February 28 and March 25, 1985).  
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based lawyer critical of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) system;224 and 
(3) in written testimony from an attorney for a utilities company (also 
criticizing the ALJ system).225  In short, because the text and legislative 
history of the FCA neither permit nor prohibit arbitration, they fail to show 
that Congress intended qui tam claims to be unarbitrable. 
Relators’ best chance at escaping their arbitration clauses, therefore, will 
be to demonstrate that there is an “inherent conflict” between arbitration and 
the FCA’s underlying purposes. Nonetheless, relators face an uphill battle,  
as the Supreme Court addressed and rejected many of relators’ strongest 
arguments in its 1991 decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.226  
There, the Court held that claims under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA) can be subject to arbitration, even though 
arbitration conflicts with the statute’s social purposes, is agreed to on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis, impairs cooperation between plaintiffs and the 
Government, and severely limits discovery.227 
The rest of this part addresses the sources of conflict raised in Gilmer 
and examines whether relators can sufficiently distinguish the FCA from the 
ADEA so as to keep their claims in court.  In doing so, it shows that while 
arbitration would significantly impair qui tam litigation—and potentially 
blunt relators’ ability to litigate their claims—that conflict is not so 
“inherent” under prevailing Supreme Court case law as to render arbitration 
clauses unenforceable.  As a result, defendants can undermine enforcement 
of the FCA without losing their ability to arbitrate. 
 
 224. Program Fraud Civil Penalties Act of 1985, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on 
Oversight of Government Management of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States 
Senate, 99th Cong. 339 (June 18, 1985) (statement of J.H. McQuiston). 
 225. Overview of False Claims and Fraud Legislation, Hearing Before the Committee on the 
Judiciary, United States Senate, 99th Cong.123 (June 17, 1986) (statement of Edward Sneeden). 
 226. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991). 
 227. Id. at 27-33. 
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A. The Broad Social Purposes of the FCA Do Not Invalidate Arbitration 
The first source of conflict is also the most intuitive—arbitration 
interferes with the social purposes of the FCA.  Whistleblowing furthers 
societal interests by breaking the “conspiracy of silence” surrounding frauds 
and “bring[ing] such wrongdoing to light.”228  Arbitration, on the other hand, 
protects individual interests by ensuring secrecy, brevity, and 
inscrutability.229  The combination of the two seems untenable: how can a 
relator blow the whistle if no one can hear? 
This difficulty with this argument is that the FCA achieves its social 
goals without bringing wrongdoing to public light.  Whistleblowers are 
barred from publicly disclosing their allegations prior to filing a complaint 
with the DOJ230 and from publicly discussing their complaints while their 
filings remain under seal with the agency.231  In addition, the text of the FCA 
permits the Department of Justice to “pursue [FCA claims] through any 
alternate remedy available to the Government,” including arbitration, and 
agency guidelines favor the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in 
qui tam cases.232  As the DOJ’s “Policy on the Use of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution” establishes, almost 90% of FCA actions settle and 
approximately half of those do so prior to the agency’s filing a complaint in 
court.233  Thus, “[t]he nature of the cases indicates that they are good 
candidates for ADR mechanisms.”234 
 
 228. U.S. ex rel. Biddle v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ., 161 F.3d 533, 539 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
 229. Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing 
Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1625 (2005) 
 230. Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 478 (2007). 
 231. JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS § 4.04 (4th ed. 2013). 
 232. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) (2012); United States v. Bankers Ins. Co., 245 F.3d 315, 324 (4th 
Cir. 2001) (compelling DOJ into nonbinding arbitration). 
 233. Policy on the Use of Alt. Dispute Resolution, 61 Fed.Reg. 36895, 36899 (1996). 
 234. Id. 
41
Andrews: Whistling in Silence: The Implications of Arbitration on Qui Tam
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2015
  
[Vol. 15: 203, 2015] Whistling in Silence 
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
244 
Given that the FCA serves its deterrent function by revealing 
wrongdoing to the DOJ, not necessarily to the general public, the social 
policy argument fails to show that qui tam arbitration inherently conflicts 
with the purposes of the FCA.  As the Supreme Court held in Gilmer, “[S]o 
long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] 
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to 
serve both its remedial and deterrent function.”235 
B. Arbitration Clauses in Qui Tam Actions Are Not a Unique Form of 
Adhesion Contract 
The second argument against qui tam arbitration is that relators should 
not be bound by adhesion contracts when suing on behalf of the 
Government.  The court in Gilmer left open whether in some circumstances 
a contract of adhesion would render an arbitration contract unenforceable.236  
Subsequently, one lower court has held that qui tam actions are not 
arbitrable because arbitration clauses in qui tam actions are a unique form of 
adhesion contract.237  As the argument goes, arbitration clauses in 
employment contracts are ordinarily non-negotiable.238  Additionally, while 
a relator is not an officer of the Government, she does act on its behalf.  
Given this relationship, the rationale in favor of federal court jurisdiction is 
like the rationale behind 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a),239  which allows removal from 
state to federal court of any case in which an officer of the United States is a 
defendant for “the protection of agents of the government when they do the 
Government’s business.”240 
 
 235. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)). 
 236. Id. at 32-33. 
 237. Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 121 F. Supp. 2d 643, 647 (N.D. Ohio 2000). 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
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This argument suffers from several problems.  First, this type of 
adhesion contract is “unfair” only if the court assumes that arbitrators will be 
biased against the Government or relators.  The Supreme Court in Gilmer, 
however, “decline[d] to indulge the presumption that the parties and arbitral 
body conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain 
competent, conscientious and impartial arbitrators.”241  Second, the argument 
that relators are pseudo-agents of the Government creates a double standard.  
The only reason that relators can release (or sell) their claims is that they are 
not government officials.242  It is therefore contradictory to bar relators from 
arbitrating their claims on the grounds that they are effectively government 
officials, while at the same time permitting them to sell their claims because 
they are not.  The adhesion contract objection is thus unavailing. 
C. While Arbitration Would Impair Cooperation Between Relators and the 
DOJ, This Is Not an “Inherent” Conflict Sufficient to Prevent 
Arbitration 
The strongest argument against qui tam arbitration is its effect on the 
DOJ.  In order to enforce the FCA, the DOJ depends on “cooperation” from 
“individuals who are either close observers or otherwise involved in the 
fraudulent activity.”243  Relators’ assistance covers a range of tasks, such as 
providing the Government factual and legal research, drafting internal 
government position papers, interviewing fact witnesses, preparing the 
Government’s expert witnesses, reviewing documents produced by 
defendants, and supplying paralegals and other clerical help to the 
 
 241. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30. 
 242. As a general rule, a public officer cannot assign unearned salary or fees of his or her 
office.  See FARNSWORTH, supra note 100, at 77-79.  The rule prevents public officers from being 
deprived of their means of support, which might impair performance of their services. 
 243. U.S. ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 
1149, 1154 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting S.REP. NO. 345, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S. 
Code Cong. & Admin. News 5271).  
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government.244  As a result, courts have described relators’ cooperation as 
“crucial to the ‘successful resolution of the [DOJ’s] case.’”245 
Arbitration undermines this “informal coordination among individual 
claimants.”246  Through confidentiality provisions, arbitration clauses would 
likely prevent relators from arranging with the Government to produce 
common research and reports.247  Further, even if the Government did go to 
trial, whistleblowers would not be able to act as co-litigants in the case.248  
Thus, even if the DOJ were to intervene in a qui tam suit, the agency would 
have to litigate alone and without the relator’s assistance at trial. 
This conflict, although significant, is likely not so “inherent” under 
Supreme Court case law as to render qui tam arbitration unenforceable.  The 
Supreme Court in Gilmer rejected a similar cooperation-based objection in 
 
 244. Robert Fabrikant & Nkechinyem Nwabuzor, In the Shadow of the False Claims Act: 
“Outsourcing” the Investigation by Government Counsel to Relator Counsel During the Seal 
Period, 83 N.D. L. REV. 837, 843 (2007); Suzanne Durrell, The Relator’s Role in False Claims Act 
Investigations: Towards a New Paradigm, DURRELL L. OFF. 8-14 (2012), 
http://www.taf.org/2012%20TAFEF%20Conference%20Documents/Durrell%20Article%20--
%20Relator’s%20Role%20in%20FCA%20Investigations.pdf. 
 245. Miller v. Holzmann, 575 F. Supp. 2d 2, 23-24 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of 
Concerned Veterans v. Sec’y of Def., 675 F.2d 1319, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).  
 246. Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2318 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
 247. Id. at 2316.  Recently, the SEC has cracked down on employers’ use of confidentiality 
provisions to limit whistleblowers from filing complaints with the agency.  James Burns et al., SEC 
Brings First Whistleblower Enforcement Action for Overly Restrictive Confidentiality Agreements, 
Wilkie Farr & Gallagher LLP 1 (2015), 
http://www.willkie.com/~/media/Files/Publications/2015/04/SEC_Brings_First_Whistleblower_Enf
orcement_Action_for_Overly_Restrictive_Confidentiality_Agreements.pdf.  The SEC did so 
pursuant to Rule 21F-17, which prohibits any person from enforcing, or threatening to enforce, a 
confidentiality agreement that impedes an employee’s ability to reports a possible securities law 
violation to the SEC.  Id.  The DOJ lacks a similar rule to enforce reporting under the FCA, and 
therefore is unlikely to be able to police the use of confidentiality agreements as aggressively as the 
SEC. 
 248. Id. (“The agreement also disallows any kind of joinder or consolidation of claims or 
parties.”).  
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the context of the ADEA.249  While the ADEA does not contain a qui tam 
provision, the statute creates a mechanism through which an individual 
brings a private cause of action.250  In order to bring suit, an aggrieved 
individual must first file a charge with the EEOC and then wait at least 180 
days.251  If the EEOC declines to bring a charge, the individual may litigate 
the case on her own.  If the EEOC files suit, the employee loses her cause of 
action but may intervene in the EEOC’s case.252  The statute, therefore, 
envisions that the individual and agency will cooperate extensively during 
the litigation.253 
As the Gilmer Court held, the fact that arbitration may impair 
cooperation between individuals and the Government does not necessarily 
render the conflict “inherent.”254  For a cooperation-based conflict to 
foreclose arbitration, an arbitration clause must do more than undermine 
those select disputes in which the Government and individuals cooperate.  
Instead, plaintiffs must demonstrate “that Congress intended that the 
[Government] be involved in all . . . disputes,” such that arbitration would 
conflict with all litigation brought under the statute.255 
Relators face an uphill battle under this standard. The FCA contemplates 
instances in which the Government would not be involved in litigation.  For 
example, the FCA allows relators to proceed independently when the DOJ 
declines a suit—the situation in the majority of qui tam actions.256  
 
 249. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28-29 (1991). 
 250. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (2012). 
 251. Id. 
 252. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1). 
 253. Kozlowski v. Extendicare Health Serv., Inc., No. 99-4338, 2000 WL 193502 (E.D. Pa. 
Feb. 17, 2000). 
 254. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28-29. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Christina Orsini Broderick, Note, Qui Tam Provisions and the Public Interest: An 
Empirical Analysis, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 949, 971 (2007) (noting that the DOJ declined to intervene 
in seventy-eight percent of cases between 1987 and 2004).  
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Moreover, even where the DOJ does intervene, the FCA enables to the 
Government to limit relators’ assistance.  The statute provides that the 
Government upon intervening assumes “primary responsibility for 
prosecuting the action,”257 and grants the DOJ the ability to restrict the 
relator’s involvement in the litigation.258  Accordingly, even if the 
Government did have a role in all qui tam litigation, relators arguably do not 
(other than serving as a named party in the dispute).  The fact that the DOJ is 
“heavily involved” in the enforcement of the FCA therefore is likely “not 
sufficient to preclude arbitration.”259 
The DOJ’s enforcement of the FCA does differ in one significant way 
from the EEOC’s enforcement of the ADEA.  The DOJ has the right to 
intervene in the private litigant’s action,260  and may intervene either initially 
when a relator files a complaint, or later when the agency has declined a 
complaint but shows “good cause” for entering the suit.261  Qui tam 
arbitration raises a unique dilemma under the latter scenario.  Should the 
DOJ intervene once the suit has been declined and the relator has been 
compelled into arbitration, it would appear that the agency would also have 
to enter arbitration.  After all, there are no ongoing court proceedings into 
which the DOJ could intervene.  Thus, qui tam arbitration raises the 
possibility that the Government—as a non-signatory to a private arbitration 
agreement—could lose its right to a judicial proceeding. 
Despite this concern, the DOJ can most likely pursue its action in court.  
When a court compels arbitration it ordinarily does not dismiss the action.262  
Instead, the judge stays the proceedings for the duration of the arbitration.  
 
 257. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1). 
 258. Id. § 3730(c)(2)(C)-(D). 
 259. Id. 
 260. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1), (3). 
 261. Supra Section I. 
 262. MediVas, LLC v. Marubeni Corp., 741 F.3d 4, 9 (9th Cir. 2014).  
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As a result, the DOJ does not intervene in the arbitration itself when it 
intervenes in a relator’s suit.  It intervenes in the stayed court proceeding.263 
Under these circumstances, a cooperation-based challenge would likely 
be unsuccessful unless an arbitration clause prevents a relator from filing a 
complaint with the DOJ.264  An arbitration agreement concerning the FCA, 
however, likely would not prohibit a relator from filing a complaint.265  Even 
if a defendant were to draft an arbitration clause prohibiting DOJ filings, that 
clause would be impossible to enforce in practice.  Since relators file 
complaints with the DOJ under seal, defendants do not discover the 
pendency of a qui tam action until after the DOJ unseals the action.266  By 
that time, it is too late to un-inform the Government of the relator’s 
allegations. 
 
 263. See THOMAS H. OEHMKE, 3 COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 61:19 (2013) (“[W]hile a 
nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement has no right to participate in arbitration . . . intervention 
may be requested if and when that arbitral proceeding enters the judicial system (e.g., motion to 
compel arbitration, to appoint an arbitrator, to vacate or confirm an award, and the like).”).  The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Rockwell International Corp. v. United States also supports this 
interpretation.  Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 477 (2007) (quoting United 
States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 614 F.2d 843, 845 (C.A.3 1979)).  There, the Court held that the public 
disclosure bar prevented a relator from proceeding in court because the relator had disclosed 
information about the alleged frauds to the FBI, which then transmitted the information to the media.  
The Court concluded that the inability of the relator to bring suit did not prevent the DOJ from 
intervening in the action.  Id.  As the Supreme Court ruled, “an intervenor’s claim does not rise and 
fall with the claim of the original party.”  Id.  Instead, as an intervenor, the DOJ can proceed in court 
even if a relator cannot. 
 264. As the Gilmer court recognized, plaintiffs have a stronger argument that “arbitration will 
undermine the role of the [Government]” should arbitration disrupt plaintiffs’ “free[dom] to file a 
charge with [a Government agency].”  Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 
(1991). 
 265. See Deck v. Miami Jacobs Bus. Coll. Co., No. 3:12-cv-63, 2013 WL 394875 (S.D. Ohio 
Jan. 31, 2013).  
 266. Jay A. Brozost & A. Jeff Ifrah, I Tell Them, I Tell Them Not: Deciding When and How to 
Disclose False Claims Act Lawsuits to Shareholders, ACC DOCKET, January/February 2008, at 44, 
51. 
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D. FCA Claims Do Not Require Greater Discovery Than Other Arbitrable 
Claims 
The final argument against qui tam arbitration is that arbitral 
proceedings would hinder discovery and prevent relators from vindicating 
their actions.  Qui tam suits often involve allegations of thousands of false 
claims made by over a hundred defendants across dozens of states.267  Thus, 
plaintiffs must obtain a “massive number of documents” in order to prove 
their claims.268 
It is no secret that arbitration diminishes discovery.  As one court has 
put it, “A hallmark of arbitration—and a necessary precursor to its efficient 
operation—is a limited discovery process.”269  Arbitral houses, therefore, 
give “almost total discretion to arbitrators” to grant or deny discovery in 
large commercial proceedings.270  Arbitration clauses often limit the number 
of available depositions,271 and it is unclear whether arbitrators can compel 
non-party discovery.272  As a result, relators face the specter of a 
significantly curtailed discovery process in arbitration.  Indeed, the very fact 
 
 267. See, e.g., United States v. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 469 F.3d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(noting that the relator filed its complaint against 132 hospitals across thirty states); U.S. ex rel. Ven-
A-Care v. Actavis Mid Atl. LLC, 659 F. Supp. 2d 262, 271 (D. Mass. 2009) (denying motion to 
dismiss where the qui tam relator’s complaint alleged that pharmaceutical companies had filed tens 
of thousands of fraudulent Medicaid claims).   
 268. See Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1416 (9th Cir. 1992); Michael Loucks, Impacts 
of the Affordable Care Act and Anti-Kickback Legislation on Health Care Industry Clients, 
ASPATORE, June 2013, at 1, 10, available at 2013 WL 3772666 (predicting that the scope of 
discovery will increase with the passage of the Affordable Care Act and the statute’s additional 
reporting requirements on health care organizations).  
 269. COMSAT Corp. v. Nat’l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269, 276 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 270. David W. Lannetti, Protecting Contracting Parties in Construction Arbitrations Based on 
the Availability—or Nonavailability—of Nonparty Discovery, CONSTR. LAW, Fall 2009, at 24, 24-25. 
 271. John Wilkinson, Arbitration Contract Clauses: A Potential Key to a Cost-Effective 
Process, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2009, at 9, 9-10. 
 272. Daniel R. Strader, Bridging the Gap: Amending the Federal Arbitration Act to Allow 
Discovery of Nonparties, 41 STETSON L. REV. 909, 922-23 (2012) 
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that defendants wish to compel qui tam claims into arbitration appears to 
evidence this threat. 
Despite these risks, it is unlikely that relators would prevail on 
discovery-related objections to arbitration.  The Supreme Court has required 
arbitration of numerous complex commercial disputes requiring substantial 
discovery, including securities cases, antitrust suits, and RICO claims.273  
While complex, it is unclear that qui tam cases require more documentation 
than other arbitrable disputes.274  And as the Supreme Court held in Gilmer, 
courts will not deny arbitration “based on speculation that the arbitrator may 
not allow adequate discovery.”275 
VII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF ARBITRATION ON THE DOJ 
As the previous part demonstrates, qui tam arbitration would not 
“inherently” conflict with the purposes of the FCA.  Nonetheless, there is 
still significant conflict.  Arbitration impairs the DOJ’s ability to cooperate 
with whistleblowers, and limits the amount of discovery available to 
relators.  Given the complexity of qui tam claims, compulsory arbitration 
could blunt the effectiveness of the FCA and tip the scales in defendants’ 
favor.  The extent to which this will occur is an empirical question. 
Empirics aside, corporate defendants will likely aggressively seek qui 
tam arbitration in the coming years.  The reason relates to a “new procedural 
development” in how the DOJ investigates and intervenes in suits.276  As 
 
 273. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/Am. 
Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).  
 274. In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 285-87 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting In re 
Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1155 (N.D.Ill.1979)) (compelling arbitration of 
antitrust claim even though “the heart of any American antitrust case is the discovery of business 
documents.  Without them, there is virtually no case.”).  
 275. Id. 
 276. Grayson Yeargin & Conor S. Harris, Government’s Increased Use of Noncommittal 
Intervention Filings Complicates Qui Tam Proceedings Under the False Claims Act, NIXON 
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originally envisioned by Congress, a qui tam complaint remains under seal 
for sixty days upon filing, during which time the DOJ investigates and 
decides whether to intervene.277  While Congress intended a prompt 
investigation,278 the agency’s limited resources have made this impossible.279  
The DOJ instead has aggressively moved the courts to lengthen the seal 
period for pending claims and grant the agency more time to investigate. 
While courts initially complied with the DOJ’s requests,280 judges have 
grown increasingly impatient with the agency as seal times have grown to 
six times the original length contemplated by the FCA.281  As a result, the 
DOJ has shifted tactics.  Instead of moving to extend the seal period, the 
agency has begun unsealing cases while issuing notices that DOJ will not 
intervene “at this time.”282 Under the DOJ’s new approach, relators will be 
expected to carry cases forward by beginning discovery and shouldering the 
costs themselves, with the hope that the DOJ will eventually intervene.283 
The DOJ’s change in policy could create an arbitrable tipping point.  
Given the DOJ’s backlog of over one thousand sealed complaints284—and 
 
PEABODY LLP, Apr. 18, 2013, at 1, 1, 
http://www.nixonpeabody.com/files/156465_GIWC_Alert_Qui_Tam_Proceedural_Developments_1
8APR2013.pdf.  
 277. JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS § 4.04 (4th ed. 2013). 
 278. Id. (“The government must substantiate any claims of ‘good cause’ before an extension 
may be granted.  In its consideration of what constitutes ‘good cause,’ Congress specifically rejected 
justifications such as the prosecutor’s workload or the mere existence of a criminal investigation.”). 
 279. In recent years, the number of complaints filed with the DOJ has skyrocketed, leaving the 
agency with over 1,300 sealed cases as of January 2011.  See John T. Bentivoglio et al., False 
Claims Act Investigations: Time for a New Approach?, SKADDEN (May 12, 2011), 
http://skadden.com/Index.cfm?contentID=51&itemID=2421 (“We predict that there will be an 
increase in the number of cases where the government delays an intervention decision, and the 
litigation is pushed forward by the whistleblower and his/her attorney.”). 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id.; see Yeargin & Harris, supra note 276.  
 282. Yeargin & Harris, supra note 276, at 2. 
 283. Id. 
 284. See Bentivoglio et al., supra note 279.  
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judicial pressure on the agency to make more rapid intervention decisions—
a considerable number of qui tam actions will enter the judiciary in the short 
term.  In response, defendants will likely try to contain the costs of 
defending such actions by aggressively seeking arbitration.285  Since the 
federal courts have already begun to hold qui tam claims arbitrable, judges 
have an alternative to letting declined actions mount on their dockets: 
compel arbitration.  Indeed, it is telling that the decision in Deck—the first 
judicial opinion compelling qui tam arbitration—came within three months 
of the DOJ’s change in policy.286 
As the rest of this part demonstrates, qui tam arbitration could tip the 
balance in defendants’ favor by doing more than simply limiting relator’s 
rights.  While an adverse judgment in arbitration almost certainly would be 
binding on a relator, qui tam arbitration could also limit the right of the 
Government to a judicial forum.  Should the DOJ intervene into a relator’s 
action, defendants might be able to compel the agency into arbitration.  
Likewise, if the DOJ intervenes after an adverse judgment in arbitration, the 
agency could be barred from relitigating the claims or issues. If either of 
these scenarios were to occur, qui tam arbitration could do what no 
arbitrable claim has done before.  It could limit the Government’s right to 
prosecute actions based on an arbitration clause signed only by private 
individuals.287 
 
 285. According to a survey from 1998, the average cost of defending a declined action was 
$1,431,660.  William E. Kovacic, The Civil False Claims Act as a Deterrent to Participation in 
Government Procurement Markets, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 201, 226 (1998). 
 286. Compare Deck v. Miami Jacobs Bus. Coll. Co., 2013 WL 394875, at *6-7 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 
31, 2013), with Yeargin & Harris, supra note 276. 
 287. See E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 297 (2002) (declining to decide whether 
an adverse judgment against an individual bringing a claim under the ADEA would bar an executive 
agency from bringing a claim for the same conduct under the act). 
51
Andrews: Whistling in Silence: The Implications of Arbitration on Qui Tam
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2015
  
[Vol. 15: 203, 2015] Whistling in Silence 
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
254 
A. An Adverse Judgment in Arbitration Would Be Binding on Relators 
The district court in Deck (the first decision to order qui tam arbitration) 
left open a significant question—whether an adverse judgment in arbitration 
would be binding on relators.  The court compelled what it called 
“mandatory” arbitration, which is an ambiguous term that could be either 
binding or non-binding.288  Despite this oversight, relators are unlikely to 
avoid an adverse judgment should the arbitration not go in their favor.  As 
previously noted, parties can be bound by an adverse judgment in arbitration 
even if there are other “real parties in interest” that did not participate.289  
Furthermore, district courts lack discretion to order non-binding arbitration 
where the parties’ contracts specifically call for binding arbitration.290  Thus, 
given that arbitration clauses ordinarily mandate binding arbitration,291 it is 
unlikely that qui tam arbitration would be non-binding. 
Additionally, it is unlikely that the DOJ could release relators from 
arbitration by intervening in the suits.292  On the one hand, the FCA does 
state that if the Government intervenes, it “shall not be bound by an act of 
the person bringing the action.”293  Nonetheless, the FCA does not state that 
the relator shall not be bound.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Rockwell 
 
 288. Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. Miller, 523 U.S. 866, 884 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 289. Supra note 154. 
 290. McKee v. Home Buyers Warranty Corp. II, 45 F.3d 981, 983-84 (5th Cir. 1995); O’Hara 
v. Dist., 56 F.3d 1514, 1522 (D.C. Cir. 1995); St. Lawrence Explosives Corp. v. Worthy Bros. 
Pipeline Corp., 916 F. Supp. 187, 190 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding arbitration can be non-binding only 
if the parties explicitly state so in their contract); see Com. Enterprises v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 958 
F.2d 376 (9th Cir. 1992) (compelling non-binding arbitration because contract was ambiguous); 
Centurion Air Cargo, Inc. v. United Parcel Serv. Co., 300 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1286 (S.D. Fla. 2004) 
aff’d, 420 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir. 2005) (compelling binding arbitration in the “absence of language in 
the policy indicating that the arbitration clause was non-binding). 
 291. 9 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS SOLUTIONS § 48:20 (2014). 
 292. The DOJ declines to intervene in the majority of qui tam actions—meaning this scenario 
would be a rarity.  Broderick, supra note 256, at 971. 
 293. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2012). 
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(described in Part VI.B.) illustrates this point.294  There, a relator made a 
public disclosure that disqualified him from bringing a claim.295  The DOJ 
then intervened in the action, and argued that its participation should absolve 
the relator of its public disclosure.296  The Supreme Court nonetheless barred 
the relator from participating in the suit.297  If the DOJ’s intervention 
decision cannot cure a public disclosure made by a relator, it also cannot 
wipe away an arbitration agreement.  Thus, the DOJ’s degree of 
participation in a qui tam suit cannot release a relator from binding 
arbitration. 
B. If the DOJ Declines an Action but Later Intervenes, Defendants Might Be 
Able to Compel the Agency into Arbitration 
As the previous discussion demonstrates, relators are unlikely to escape 
enforcement of their arbitration clauses. There is a remaining question, 
however, as to whether a relator’s arbitration agreement could limit the 
Government from litigating its own FCA claims in court. As a general rule, a 
court can compel into arbitration only those parties that are signatories to an 
arbitration agreement.298  Nonetheless, federal courts have recognized a 
number of theories, arising out of common law principles of contract and 
agency, under which nonsignatories may be bound to the arbitration 
agreements of others.299  Among these theories, a nonsignatory can be forced 
 
 294. Supra Section V.B.; Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 477 (2007). 
 295. Rockwell, 549 U.S. at 477. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. 
 298. See Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 
S.Ct. 1347, 1353, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960) (“Arbitration is contractual by nature—‘a party cannot be 
required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.’”).  
 299. Reid v. Doe Run Res. Corp., 701 F.3d 840, 846 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Noble Drilling 
Servs. v. Certex USA, Inc., 620 F.3d 469, 473 (5th Cir. 2010)); Merrill Lynch Inv. Managers v. 
Optibase, Ltd., 337 F.3d 125, 131 (2d Cir. 2003).  
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to arbitrate if it “knowingly seek[s] and obtain[s] ‘direct benefits’ from the 
contract” containing the arbitration clause.300  Based on this doctrine of 
equitable estoppel, defendants potentially could compel the DOJ into 
arbitration should the agency initially decline to intervene in qui tam action 
but later change its mind. 
When the DOJ intervenes in a declined suit, it ordinarily does so based 
on information produced in the legal proceedings.301 The FCA itself states 
that “[i]f the Government so requests, it shall be served with copies of all 
pleadings filed in the [declined] action and . . . copies of all deposition 
transcripts.”302  By the same token, if the DOJ intervenes in a suit that has 
gone to arbitration, it likely will have done so based on materials from the 
actual arbitration. 
There is an open question as to whether the DOJ, by knowingly seeking 
and obtaining this information, receives a “direct” benefit from the contract 
containing the arbitration clause sufficient to warrant arbitration of the 
agency’s claims.  Like any issue of causation, “directness” is not black and 
white concept but rather operates on a sliding scale.303 This ambiguity gives 
defendants the opportunity to compel the Government into arbitration. 
The Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Blaustein v. Huete illustrates the 
point.304  There, a company signed a fee agreement (containing an arbitration 
clause) for legal services from a law firm.305 An employee of the company 
later sued the law firm for malpractice and other claims, based on the 
employee’s “separate attorney-client relationships with the [law firm] . . . 
 
 300. Id. 
 301. Bentivoglio et al., supra note 279; Yeargin & Harris, supra note 276, at 2. 
 302. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3). 
 303. Rashad v. Walsh, 300 F.3d 27, 34 (1st Cir. 2002) (“The inquiry into causation involves a 
sliding scale: deliberately dilatory tactics must be weighed more heavily against the state than 
periods of delay resulting from negligence.”).  
 304. Blaustein v. Huete, 449 F. App’x 347, 350 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 305. Id. at 349-50. 
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not the relationship embodied in the fee agreement.”306 The Fifth Circuit 
nonetheless compelled arbitration of a non-signatory employee’s claims.307 
As the court held, the non-signatory “embraced” the arbitration contract 
because he “obtained the same sort of benefits from the fee agreement that a 
client would have received: research, reasoning, drafting, and filing, all 
informed by the [attorney’s] legal training.”308 Had the contract not existed, 
the non-signatory “would have had to hire his own . . . attorney to perform 
these tasks.”309  Further, because some of the employee’s allegations referred 
to the company “by name,” these allegations “invite[d] [the court] to 
reference the fee agreement” and the arbitration clause therein, and therefore 
made it appropriate for the court to compel arbitration.310 
The relationship between the DOJ and a relator bears some similar 
characteristics.  The DOJ is not an employee of a relator.  However, by using 
the FCA’s statutory provisions to seek and obtain arbitration materials, the 
DOJ receives benefits from arbitration through access to materials that 
would ordinarily be confidential.311  Without the relator’s arbitration clause, 
these documents would not exist, and the agency “would have had to hire 
[its] own . . . attorney to perform these tasks.” Further, given that the DOJ 
would undoubtedly reference the relator “by name” during the litigation, 
 
 306. Id. at 349. 
 307. Id. at 350. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. 
 311. See generally Eagle Star Ins. Co. v. Arrowood Indem. Co., No. 13 CV 3410(HB), 2013 
WL 5322573 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2013) (noting parties’ arbitration clause agreed to keep all 
pleadings and depositions confidential); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Randall & Quilter Reins. Co., 
No. 2:07-cv-0120, 2007 WL 2326878 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 10, 2007) (noting typical form agreement for 
arbitration includes a clause providing that “briefs, depositions, and hearing transcripts generated in 
the course of the arbitration and documents produced during the arbitration, as well as the final 
arbitration decision itself, will all be kept confidential”); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent 
Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1625 (2005) (noting general trend toward confidentiality in 
arbitration). 
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since the relator is a party to the action,312 this may also invite the court to 
reference the relator’s employment contract and the arbitration clause 
therein. 
This argument does suffer from its flaws.  Receiving a benefit from a 
contract containing an arbitration clause is not sufficient to compel a non-
signatory into arbitration.313 The benefit must be “direct,” and a benefit is 
merely indirect “where the nonsignatory exploits the contractual relation of 
parties to an agreement, but does not exploit (and thereby assume) the 
agreement itself.”314 
The Second Circuit’s decision in Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration 
Ass’n is exemplary.315  There, two companies contracted to trade with each 
other and signed an arbitration clause.316  A third-party competitor then 
acquired one of the companies.317  The Second Circuit held that the 
competitor could not be later compelled into arbitration.318  As the court 
reasoned, if the competitor had “directly benefitted from the . . .  Agreement 
by seeking to purchase equipment . . .  it would be estopped from avoiding 
arbitration.”319  Nonetheless, the competitor’s benefit derived solely from the 
purchase of one of the companies and not from the contract itself—
therefore, rendering the benefit “indirect.”320 
Based on this decision, the DOJ has a strong argument that any benefit it 
derives from the arbitration clause is indirect.  Like the competitor in 
Thomson-CSF, the DOJ has purchased the services of an entity—the relator.  
 
 312. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1) (2012). 
 313. MAG Portfolio Consultant, GMBH v. Merlin Biomed Grp. LLC, 268 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 
2001). 
 314. Id. 
 315. Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 779 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 316. Id. at 775-76. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. at 778-79. 
 319. Id. at 779. 
 320. Id.  
56
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol15/iss2/1s: /digitalcommons.pe perdine.edu/drlj/vol15/i s2/1
  
 [Vol. 15: 203, 2015] Whistling in Silence 
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
259 
In turn, when the DOJ requests information from the relator, it “exploits” the 
contractual relationship between the relator and the defendant rather than the 
employment agreement itself.  Since the DOJ is a passive recipient of 
information from the relator, any benefit it derives would be indirect. 
This argument is persuasive and, in isolation, would likely lead a court 
to reject an attempt to compel the DOJ into arbitration.  Nonetheless, courts 
adjudicating the issue of “direct benefits” estoppel should be mindful that 
“directness” is only a proxy for a more fundamental inquiry: whether it 
would be inequitable to allow a non-signatory to derive benefits from 
arbitration, but still permit that entity to proceed in court.  And in this equity 
analysis, defendants have a potential advantage. 
Common law rules of partial assignment allow a defendant to join the 
assignor and partial assignee to the same lawsuit.321  This right protects the 
defendant’s interest in being “free of successive and repeated suits growing 
out of the same basic facts.”322  Based on this principle, a defendant could 
request the court to join the Government to the arbitration.  Even if the 
Government’s benefit is arguably “indirect,” a separate judicial action raises 
the specter of repeated suits based on the same operative facts.  Regardless 
of the merits of arbitration, a court may find it inequitable to allow the 
Government to use information from a confidential arbitral proceeding to 
bring its own judicial proceeding for the same conduct and on the same 
claims.  As a result, a court might join the Government to the relator’s 
arbitration. 
Compelling arbitration in the context of a partial assignment is not 
unprecedented.  Only one federal court has considered arbitration based on 
 
 321. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 158 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976); 4 A. CORBIN, 
CONTRACTS § 889 (1951) (“[U]nless the obligor has consented, the partial assignee may not 
maintain the original suit against the obligor unless all parties having the collective right to the entire 
claim are joined in the proceeding.”); In re Fine Paper Litig. State of Wash., 632 F.2d 1081, 1091 
(3d Cir. 1980) (quoting same). 
 322. Fine Paper Litig., 632 F.2d at 1091. 
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common law rules of partial assignment.323  There, a plaintiff who had 
partially assigned its claim sought to arbitrate disputes arising out of a 
charter contract.324  In addition to granting the motion to compel, the court 
added that it must “protect the respondent from a possible multiple claim” 
and “avoid piecemeal litigation in case of a partial assignment.”325  As a 
result, the court ordered both the assignor and the partial assignee into 
arbitration—even though only one of the parties had signed the original 
charter contract.326 
In sum, both defendants and the Government have strong arguments as 
to whether the benefit that the state derives from relators is sufficiently 
direct to compel arbitration.  In light of the common law right to join 
assignors and partial assignees into the same proceeding, however, courts 
could logically conclude that the balance of the equities would favor 
arbitration.  As a result, corporate defendants could prevent the DOJ from to 
avoiding arbitration’s limitations on discovery and blunt the agency’s ability 
to intervene and prosecute qui tam suits. 
C. If the DOJ Does Not Intervene, the Agency Could Be Bound by an 
Adverse Judgment Against a Relator 
Given the risks of intervening while the relator’s arbitration is ongoing, 
the DOJ may decide to intervene only once the arbitration has concluded.  
The agency could then enter the suit when the relator appeals the arbitration 
judgment in federal district court.  This approach could free the agency to 
relitigate the claims and issues decided in the relator’s suit de novo, as the 
agency was a non-party to the arbitration and therefore would not bound by 
doctrines of preclusion. 
 
 323. See Tex. San Juan Oil Corp. v. An-Son Offshore Drilling Co., 194 F. Supp. 396 (S.D.N.Y. 
1961). 
 324. Id.  
 325. Id.  
 326. Id.; 1 DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 13:13 (2014).  
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Preclusion doctrines prevent parties from relitigating the same claims or 
issues finally decided in a prior adjudication.327  Generally, a person who 
was not a party to the previous action will not be bound by the judgment, as 
he or she “has not had a ‘full and fair opportunity to litigate’ the claims and 
issues settled in that suit.”328  Thus, at first glance, the Government would 
not be bound by an adverse judgment against a relator in arbitration, since it 
was never a party to the action. 
Nonetheless, the DOJ’s freedom to relitigate in district court is not as 
clear as the rules on non-party preclusion may seem.  There are exceptions 
to the general rule that non-parties are not bound by prior adjudications.  In 
particular, nonparties can be barred from relitigating claims or issues if they 
share a substantive legal relationship justifying preclusion with the previous 
legal party (“privity”).329 
The Supreme Court has determined that the United States shares such a 
relationship with relators—at least where a whistleblower proceeds in court. 
330  As the Court recently held in Eisenstein, the “United States is bound by 
the judgment in all FCA actions regardless of its participation in the case.”331  
Whether this statement applies to arbitration is difficult to decipher, as the 
Court did not fully elaborate on its rationale.  The Court stated only that if 
“the United States believes that its rights are jeopardized by an ongoing qui 
tam action, the FCA provides for intervention.”332 
Despite the Supreme Court’s brevity, its justification echoes an 
exception to nonparty preclusion.  As the Court has recognized, a nonparty 
that has “assumed control” over litigation will be bound by the judgment, 
since the nonparty has had “the opportunity to present proofs and argument” 
 
 327. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008). 
 328. Id.  
 329. Id. at 894. 
 330. U.S. ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928, 936 (2009). 
 331. Id. 
 332. Id.  
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and “had his day in court.”333  Thus, even if the Government declines to 
intervene in a suit, is not a party, and takes no active role in the case other 
than requesting service of the pleadings, it will still be bound by the 
judgment.334  Indeed, the lower courts have used the same rationale for 
nearly twenty years to prevent the Government from relitigating issues or 
claims already decided in relators’ suits.335 
Eisenstein and lower court precedent raise significant questions of 
whether an adverse judgment against a relator in arbitration would preclude 
the Government from relitigating issues or claims in court.  On the one hand, 
those decisions were not in the context of arbitration, and both courts and 
commentators have disagreed on whether arbitration should have any 
preclusive effect on statutory claims.  Over the years, lower courts have 
struck “a case-by-case balance” in determining when preclusion principles 
apply to final determinations in arbitration.336  This balancing reflects the 
courts’ longstanding tendency “to be suspicious of relaxed arbitration 
procedures” and the “murkiness or absence of an arbitral opinion.”337  While 
many of the courts have rejected preclusion stemming from arbitration,338 
others have “yielded.”339 
 
 333. Taylor, 553 U.S. at 895 (2008) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 39 
(1982)).  
 334. Id. at 928. 
 335. Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., Inc., 619 F.3d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Stoner v. Santa 
Clara Cnty. Office of Educ., 502 F.3d 1116, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007)); U.S. ex rel. Mergent Servs. v. 
Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing same); Stoner, 502 F.3d at 1126 (citing In re 
Schimmels, 127 F.3d 875, 882 (9th Cir. 1997); Schimmels, 127 F.3d at 884. 
 336. 18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4475.1 (2d 
ed., 2014).  
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 50 (1974)); Mathews v. Denver 
Newspaper Agency LLP, 649 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 2011); Johnson v. Univ. of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee, 783 F.2d 59, 62 (7th Cir. 1986)).  
 339. 18B WRIGHT, supra note 336, § 4475.1 (citing Cent. Transp., Inc. v. Four Phase Sys., Inc., 
936 F.2d 256, 257 (6th Cir. 1991)); Benjamin v. Traffic Executive Ass’n E. R.Rs., 869 F.2d 107, 
115 (2d Cir. 1989)).  
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Further complicating the issue, the Supreme Court has declined to 
address whether a judgment in arbitration between individuals could have 
preclusive effect on the Government.  On the one occasion where the Court 
had the opportunity to resolve the issue, the Court left “open” the question of 
whether an “arbitration judgment would affect the validity of the 
[Government’s] claim or the character of relief the [Government] may 
seek.”340  In short, whether an adverse judgment in qui tam arbitration would 
preclude the Government from relitigating is a matter of first impression for 
the federal courts. 
Developing a grand theory of preclusion is beyond the scope of this 
article.  Suffice to say, if a court were satisfied with an arbitration’s 
procedures and opinion, the principles warranting preclusion broadly in qui 
tam claims would also apply to the arbitration.  Since the United States 
retains its right to intervene, it can protect its interests in the suit and, 
therefore, has effectively had its “day in court.”  Qui tam arbitration could 
therefore compel lower courts to do what no court has done before.  It could 
limit the Government’s right to relitigate actions based on an arbitration 
clause signed only by private individuals.341 
The DOJ appears to have been aware of this risk in Deck (the first 
decision compelling qui tam arbitration).  In a limited statement of interest 
filed with the court, the DOJ argued that “any arbitration ruling as to such a 
claim must necessarily be deemed a non-binding recommendation.”342  The 
six-sentence statement failed to fully elaborate on the agency’s rationale.343  
Nonetheless, the Government pointed to the text of the FCA and the fact that 
 
 340. E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 297 (2002). 
 341. Id. 
 342. Deck v. Miami Jacobs Bus. Coll. Co., No. 3:12-cv-63, 2013 WL 394875, at *6-7 (S.D. 
Ohio Jan. 31, 2013) (citing United States’ Limited Statement of Interest as to Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss or Stay Action Pending Arbitration, No. 3:12-cv-63, 2012 WL 9385215 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 
23, 2012)). 
 343. United States’ Limited Statement of Interest, 2012 WL 9385215. 
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a qui tam claim “may not be settled without the consent of the Attorney 
General.”344 
The district court in Deck declined to resolve the preclusion question.345  
Nonetheless, even if the court had reached the issue, the Government’s 
statement of interest casts little light on whether the Government would be 
precluded from relitigating an adverse judgment in arbitration.  The 
Government’s recitation of the FCA is correct: a claim may not be settled 
without consent of the Attorney General; but this has little to do with 
preclusion.  An adverse judgment in arbitration is not a “settlement.”  It is a 
dismissal.  And if a dismissal in arbitration has the same preclusive effect as 
a judgment of a court, a judge would have to dismiss a subsequent claim 
brought by the DOJ because the agency is a nonparty who is in privity with 
the relator.  Thus, the Attorney General’s veto power over settlements is 
largely irrelevant to the question of whether the DOJ is in privity with 
relators.346  As a result, the text of the FCA does not prevent the DOJ from 
being bound by an adverse judgment against a relator in arbitration. 
The Government could avoid preclusion on an alternative ground.  As 
previously noted, the lower courts have held that the Government is in 
privity with relators because of the state’s statutory right to intervene and 
control qui tam suits.  Yet the FCA does not offer an explicit mechanism for 
the Government to intervene in the arbitration.  Since the Government has 
no means to “present proofs and argument” in the arbitral hearings, the state 
should not be bound by an adverse judgment arising from the proceedings.347 
 
 344. Id. 
 345. The district court in Deck posed its response solely as a hypothetical.  “Even if mandatory 
arbitration of the Plaintiffs’ FCA claim is not binding on the United States, arbitration is appropriate 
given the substantive and procedural posture.”  Deck, 2013 WL 394875, at *6-7. 
 346. Judges also do not need consent from the government prior to dismissing a qui tam claim.  
United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335, 344 (6th Cir. 2000); U.S. ex rel. 
Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., 25 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1994); Minotti v. Lensink, 895 F.2d 
100, 103 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 347. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 895 (2008) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
JUDGMENTS § 39 (1982)). 
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This argument has persuasive value.  Yet the constraints that arbitration 
places on the DOJ are not so uncommon.  The agency’s ability to control 
relators is always limited.  For example, the DOJ cannot unilaterally control 
relators’ participation in court proceedings.  Instead, the Government must 
petition the court to limit the relator’s activities.348  The judge may then limit 
a relator’s participation upon a showing by the DOJ that the relator “would 
interfere with or unduly delay the Government’s prosecution of the case, or 
would be repetitious, irrelevant, or for purposes of harassment.”349 
Furthermore, the DOJ still has several means to control the relator’s 
arbitration.  To begin, the agency could use the aforementioned provision of 
the FCA.  Since the relator’s claims in arbitration are likely identical to those 
in the court proceedings, the DOJ would have a strong argument that the 
relator’s “unrestricted participation during the course of the litigation” would 
interfere with the agency’s prosecution.350  Since the FCA grants the court 
broad discretion to “otherwise limit[] the participation by the [relator] in the 
litigation,”351 this provision could reasonably be construed as authorizing the 
court to stay the relator’s outside proceedings (including arbitration). 
Additionally, some jurisdictions grant district courts statutory authority to 
stay arbitration proceedings at the request of third parties.352  Thus, even if 
the FCA lacks a means to stay a relator’s arbitration, state law may provide a 
way.  The DOJ therefore has several potential avenues by which to prevent 
the arbitration from proceeding to judgment. 
In sum, while any court determination on arbitration would be made on 
a “case-by-case basis,” there is the chance that a judge would rule that 
principles of preclusion bar the Government from relitigating an adverse 
judgment in arbitration against a relator.  Further, although the Supreme 
 
 348. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(C) (2012). 
 349. Id.  
 350. See id. 
 351. Id. § 3730(c)(C)(iv)(4). 
 352. Volt Info. Scis, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 
(1989) (enforcing stay of litigation at the request of a nonparty under California law).  
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Court has once dodged the issue of arbitration’s effect on the Government, it 
is unclear that the Court would do so again when considering fraud 
allegations reaching into the billions of dollars.  Until the Court decides the 
issue, however, qui tam arbitration could pose a significant impediment to 
the DOJ’s ability to enforce the FCA, should the agency not aggressively 
exercise its right to intervene and limit relators’ participation in arbitrations. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Qui tam arbitration raises fundamental questions about how far 
arbitration should extend to statutory claims.  This article demonstrates that 
Congress left a significant loophole when it passed the Dodd-Frank 
amendments in 2010.  By failing to include anti-arbitration provisions in the 
FCA, Congress set the groundwork for corporate defendants to force 
whistleblower suits into the secretive forum of arbitration.  Employers are 
now building quickly.  As the DOJ continues to push more qui tam suits into 
the federal courts, the costs of defending such actions has incentivized 
defendants to push for the cheaper, faster, and quieter avenue of arbitration. 
As part of this strategy, companies have started adding “private attorney 
general” actions to boilerplate arbitration clauses: a synonym for qui tam 
suits.  Corporations also are prevailing on their motions to compel, and are 
creating precedent in favor of qui tam arbitration.  As a result, corporate 
defendants in the coming years are developing a regime to blunt the United 
States’ primary weapon for recovering frauds against the Government.  This 
article demonstrates that it is time for Congress to respond—and to amend 
the FCA to include the same prohibitions against arbitration as the nation’s 
other whistleblower statutes. 
 
64
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol15/iss2/1s: /digitalcommons.pe perdine.edu/drlj/vol15/i s2/1
